Ezeah v. FBI, No. 24-00076, 2025 WL 2377964 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2025) (McFadden, J.)

Ezeah v. FBI, No. 24-00076, 2025 WL 2377964 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2025) (McFadden, J.)

Re: Request for records concerning plaintiff, as well as specific FBI agent

Disposition:  Granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment

• Litigation Considerations, Evidentiary Showing, Adequacy of Search:  The court holds that “[t]he FBI’s declaration provides sufficient details about the scope of the first search to find that it was adequate and conducted in good faith.” “The declarant describes the ‘extensive’ Central Records System, plausibly explains why it was the most likely location to find responsive records, attests to there being no other location likely to contain responsive records, sets out the search terms, and describes the search method.”  “The record contains no evidence contradicting the thoroughness of the FBI’s search.”
   
• Exemption 5, Deliberative Process Privilege & Foreseeable Harm and Other Considerations; Litigation Considerations, Evidentiary Showing, Foreseeable Harm Showing: The court finds that “[t]he FBI withheld ‘draft documents’ containing the handwritten notes of a special agent’s ‘thoughts, ideas, impressions, interpretations,’ and ‘investigative talking point[s]’ appearing on evidence presented ‘during [an] investigatory interview [with plaintiff] to obtain [his] . . . feedback.’”  “The FBI attests that such documents are ‘inherently part of the deliberative process to obtain potential investigatory leads’ and that they helped evaluate [plaintiff’s] assistance ‘for a potential proffer agreement.’”  “The notes were ‘fleshed out and distilled during the editorial process for the creation of the official FD-302 interview report,’ which is ‘the FBI’s final decision[.]’”  “The declaration establishes the withheld pages as (1) generated before finalization of the official FD-302 report, (2) helping to formulate a position on plea negotiations, and (3) shared only internally.”
  
  “More, the FBI has explained the foreseeable harms in disclosing the information.”  “It attests to the ‘chilling effect’ on special agents being candid in their assessments, the risks of revealing ‘internal deliberations and sorting of a multitude of ideas,’ and ‘public confusion’ over information, including preliminary ‘investigative strategies,’ that might not end up in the final, official report.”  “So the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 5 is justified.”
   
• Exemption 6; Exemption 7(C): The court relates that “[h]ere, the FBI invokes the two exemptions in tandem for documents that, by the terms of [plaintiff’s] request, were ‘compiled for law enforcement purposes’ as 7(C) requires.”  “The FBI declarant attests that the agency investigates all violations of federal law not exclusively assigned to another agency . . . and that the ‘records at issue were compiled in furtherance’ of its ‘investigation of crimes related to federal security and or [sic] commodities fraud matters[]’ . . . .”  “The FBI thus satisfied the law enforcement requirement.”  “Accordingly, the Court considers only Exemption 7(C).”  “The FBI relied on 7(C) to redact the names and other identifying information of third-party individuals – including special agents, professional staff, persons merely mentioned, persons of investigative interest, and victims.”  “The FBI plausibly explains the risks to privacy if it were to release such information, including compromising special agents’ ability to conduct other investigations by subjecting them to unofficial questioning and potentially violent reprisal.”  “The FBI attests that ‘each piece of information was scrutinized to determine the nature and strength’ of each individual’s privacy interest, which ‘was balanced against the public’s interest in disclosure.’”  “[Plaintiff], on the other hand, has not asserted any public interest that would override these privacy concerns.”  “‘Where there is no identifiable public interest, the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) prevails because something, even a modest privacy interest, outweighs nothing every time.’”
  
  “The FBI has plausibly explained more than a ‘modest privacy interest’ that would be foreseeably harmed for each of the third-party categories.”  “For the special agents, past targets and their associates would seek to ‘inflict violence.’”  “FBI administrative staff would experience similar reprisals and harassment based on their access to investigative information.”  “Third parties merely mentioned would be criticized or suspected of wrongdoing.”  “Investigative targets would experience a ‘negative stigma[ ]’ with ‘professional and social repercussions.’”  “Finally, victims would be embarrassed by ‘unsolicited and unnecessary attention’ and a ‘further invasion of their privacy.’”  “The agency has systematically detailed foreseeable harm as to each redacted type of personal information.”
  
  “In sum, the agency has justified invoking Exemption 7(C) and demonstrated foreseeable harm from releasing the exempted information.”
  
  Separately, the court relates that “the FBI responded to item two of [plaintiff’s] request by neither confirming nor denying the existence of complaints filed against the FBI agent who interviewed him.”  “Such is known as a Glomar response.”  The court finds that “[t]he FBI has met its burden here.”  “It says that these ‘records,’ ‘should they exist,’ ‘would officially confirm this individual’s identity as an employee of the FBI,’ relying on Exemptions 6 and 7(C).”  “The declarant also attests that [plaintiff] did not provide a waiver or release from the third-party individual or proof of the individual’s death, . . . , and explains why ‘official confirmation’ of the requested records ‘could reasonably be expected to draw negative and unlawful attention,’ stigmatization, and harassment to the individual and any others that could be named in the records.”
   
• Exemption 7(E): The court finds that “[t]he FBI applies this exemption ‘to non-public investigative techniques and procedures’ and ‘non-public details about techniques and procedures that are otherwise known to the public.’”  “It redacted three categories of information:  (1) sensitive investigative file and subfile numbers; (2) methods used to collect and analyze information; and (3) foci of specific investigations.”  “First, the FBI attests that the withheld file numbers ‘are not known to the public.’”  “They contain ‘three separate portions’ that ‘indicate the types of investigative and intelligence gathering programs to which these files pertain.’”  “‘Many of the FBI’s classification numbers are public’ and thus the withheld file numbers would be ‘telling’ if disclosed.”  “The file numbers also include office codes revealing the origins of investigations, which, if disclosed, ‘would provide critical information about where and how the FBI detected particular criminal behaviors or national security threats[]’ . . . .”  “Finally, they contain numbers assigned to ‘unique investigative initiatives,’ which, if disclosed, ‘would provide criminals and foreign adversaries with a tracking mechanism’ to follow ‘particular files/investigations within the context of larger FBI investigative efforts[]’ . . . .”  “‘Repeatedly releasing’ such sensitive information ‘would allow . . . criminals and foreign adversaries to obtain an exceptional understanding’ of ‘investigative intelligence available to the FBI.’”  “This, in turn, would enable wrongdoers to circumvent the law by predicting FBI investigations and structuring ‘their behavior to avoid detection and disruption by FBI investigators[.]’”
  
  “Second, the FBI withheld ‘the methods’ used ‘to collect and analyze information’ gathered for investigative purposes.”  “It attests that if released, such information would disclose ‘how and from where the FBI collects information and the methodologies employed to analyze it[.]’”  “The FBI plausibly explains that release would, among other risks, ‘enable’ wrongdoers ‘to educate themselves about the techniques employed for the collection and analysis of information’ and ‘allow [them] to take countermeasures to circumvent’ these techniques so that they could ‘continue to violate the law[.]’”
  
  “Finally, the FBI withheld the foci of ‘investigations of crimes related to federal security and or [sic] commodities fraud matters’ that ‘have not been publicly disclosed.’”  “It attests that the release of such information ‘would allow targets’ of the investigations ‘to thwart FBI efforts to investigate/disrupt their activities,’ provide ‘key information about . . . investigative strategies for pursuing’ such crimes, and reveal the agency’s ‘intelligence/evidence gathering capabilities,’ which in turn ‘would enable criminals to circumvent the law[.]’”
  
  “Exemption 7(E)’s substantive standard ‘already forces the agency to show some risk of [foreseeable] harm.’”  “But the agency also should discuss foreseeable harm as a ‘distinct, consecutive inquir[y].’”  “The FBI has done so for all three types of exempted 7(E) information.”  “Releasing each would increase the likelihood that criminals could more easily ‘circumvent the law.’”  “File and subfile numbers betray the physical location and tracking number of investigations, informing lawbreakers about current agency activities; information collection methods would educate criminals about evasion; and details about current targets would enable persons of interest to flee or obstruct justice.”  “Foreseeable harm to Exemption 7(E)’s protected interest – increasing the risk of law violation – would result.”
   
• Litigation Considerations, Evidentiary Showing, “Reasonably segregable” Showing:  The court finds that “[t]he FBI has met this burden through the combination of its declaration and Vaughn Index.”  “It attests that each responsive page was reviewed to release all reasonably segregable information.”