Francis v. IRS, No. 20-1392, 2025 WL 819572 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2025) (Walton, J.)

Francis v. IRS, No. 20-1392, 2025 WL 819572 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2025) (Walton, J.)

Re:  Request for records concerning plaintiffs’ taxes

Disposition:  Granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment; denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment

• Litigation Considerations, Adequacy of Search:  The court holds that, “[h]ere, the Court concludes that Counts Two, Six, and most of Count Seven are moot because, although the plaintiffs argue that there are additional records that the defendant may have concealed, ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents’ does not defeat the ‘presumption of good faith’ to which the declarants, relied upon by the defendant, are entitled.”  The court specifically holds that “plaintiffs ‘are not entitled “to dictate, through search instructions, the scope of [the IRS’s] search,”’ . . . .” “Indeed, the plaintiffs cannot make such a demand of the defendant because ‘an express demand that an agency search a specific record system in a FOIA request does not automatically obligate an agency to do so.’”  However, “because documents related to one of the issue numbers in Count Seven returned no responsive documents, . . . out of an abundance of caution, the Court will address whether the search the defendant conducted for those documents was adequate . . . .”  Regarding Count Seven, the court finds that “defendant has provided a good faith declaration explaining the search that was conducted that resulted in the production and release of over two-hundred pages to the plaintiffs.”
  
  “First, the Court concludes that all of the plaintiffs’ bad faith arguments fail because they advance ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents[]’ . . . or otherwise question the affidavits with extraneous or baseless conjecture . . . .”
  
  Regarding Count Three, the court relates that “defendant assigned this request to . . . an experienced employee of the defendant . . . who proceeded to conduct a search utilizing specific command codes and other indicators that would have confirmed the existence of the documents sought by the plaintiffs . . . .”  Regarding count five, “‘[defendant] conducted various searches of IDRS in order to better understand what [a specific term used in the request] meant.’” “[Defendant] was eventually able to determine that [that term] is an activity code used by the defendant when processing an amended tax return.”  “Once [defendant] made this determination, [it] ascertained that the amended return for the period in the plaintiffs’ FOIA request designated in Count Five was eventually categorized as a frivolous return and ‘was referred’ to the defendant’s ‘Frivolous Return Program (“FRP”) unit.’”  “Because the return was ultimately determined to be ‘a frivolous tax return and referred to the FRP, no additional records . . . are generated.’”  “Therefore, the defendant explains, the search returned no responsive records.” [T]o the extent the plaintiffs are arguing that the defendant did not also search the proper database, . . . such an argument is meritless because FOIA searches may not be dictated by the requestor.”  Regarding Count Eight, the court finds that, “[r]ather than providing   [additional] information [requested by defendant], the plaintiffs filed an appeal of the defendant’s final determination letter, which was ultimately rejected because the plaintiffs failed to provide the requested information to assist in additional searches for the requested records.”  “As the Court indicated earlier, the plaintiffs’ arguments largely focus on unsubstantiated – and largely irrelevant – allegations of fraud by the defendant related to a tax dispute that the Court has already rejected.”  “Nonetheless, the plaintiffs also appear to reiterate their position that the defendant should have searched other potential source locations, despite the basis for the position being reasons unrelated to their tax payment dispute with the defendant.”  “The good faith declaration submitted by the defendant describes multi-step searches several of the defendant’s employees conducted for the records sought by the plaintiffs.”  “Moreover, as the Court has stated, the plaintiffs may not dictate the databases that the defendant might have searched for the requested records.”  Regarding Counts Ten and Eleven, the court finds that “[t]he plaintiffs largely fail to respond to the defendant’s explanations regarding the first request in Count Ten and entirely ignore the defendant’s explanations regarding the request in Count Eleven.”  “They instead theorize that because of appeals documents released in another FOIA case, and additionally because they physically sent other appeals to various units within the defendant agency, the searches in this case should have uncovered an appeal memorandum responsive to the FOIA request in Count Ten.”  “However, the defendant explains why, in this case, such a document would not have been located – viz., because the plaintiffs were not entitled to appeal rights due to advancing a frivolous position that they had been entitled to a tax credit.”  “Thus, again, the plaintiffs’ speculative claims do not cast any doubt that overcomes the good faith presumption afforded to the declarations of [defendant].” Regarding Count Thirteen, the court finds that “because the document the plaintiffs sought was recovered pursuant to another request does not suggest that the search conducted for this specific request was inadequate.”  “As the defendant emphasizes, Form 8278 was released to the plaintiffs on two different occasions because, in Count Seven, the plaintiffs included issue numbers in their request.”  “On the other hand, as to Count Thirteen, the plaintiffs did not include any issue numbers and consequently, Form 8278 was not recovered in the search pursuant to this request.”  Regarding Count Fourteen, the court finds that “[h]ere, again, the Court concludes that the defendant's search for responsive records was reasonable despite the inability to discover any documents.”  “The plaintiffs believe that the defendant is aware of responsive documents but is ‘intentionally blocking’ their ability to access the responsive records.”  “However, as the Court earlier indicated, the plaintiffs’ speculation does not defeat the good faith presumption afforded to the defendant’s declarant.”
   
• Litigation Considerations, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:  Regarding Count Four of the complaint, “the Court concludes that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because ‘[t]he option for immediate judicial review “lasts only up to the point that [the defendant] actually responds[.]”’”  “Specifically, the plaintiffs received a final, appealable determination letter from the defendant on December 18, 2019 – well before they initiated this action.”  “The plaintiffs do not contest that they did not appeal or otherwise exhaust their administrative remedies; rather, they contend that they were not required to do so based upon a prior comment from [a defendant employee] in response to a question they posed seeking clarification about the range of tax years covered by the records they sought.”  “However, the plaintiffs acknowledge that, in response to their questions, [defendant’s employee] answered with a handwritten note that was delivered directly to the plaintiffs.”  “The plaintiffs acknowledge that subsequently, on December 18, 2019, they received the final determination from the defendant that no responsive records had been located pursuant to their FOIA request.”  “Therefore, although the plaintiffs may have been seeking clarification or were otherwise advised that they were not required to appeal prior to receiving the final determination letter, once the plaintiffs were on notice that a final determination had been made about their FOIA request, they were required – at that point – to appeal the defendant’s decision.”
   
• Procedural Requirements, Proper FOIA Requests:  “The Court next addresses the defendant’s arguments that Counts Nine and Twelve of the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are improper requests under the FOIA because the requests seek interrogatory-like responses or otherwise require the defendant to create new records in response to the requests.” “[T]he Court concludes that both of the plaintiffs’ FOIA requests in Counts Nine and Twelve were improper under the FOIA.”  “As to Count Nine, it is clear that the core of the plaintiffs’ requests sought information and not records – ‘functions [the] FOIA does not require.’”  “Indeed, not only did the plaintiffs ask for the names and identifying information of certain employees, . . . the plaintiffs in the request asked the defendant to place the information in a chart that the plaintiffs provided . . . .”  “Thus, the defendant was not obligated to respond to the request as pleaded in Count Nine.”  “The same holds true for the request sought in Count Twelve.”  “That request expressly makes clear that ‘[they we]re seeking the meaning, or definition, of [Argument Code 44 or] “ARG 44[,]”’ . . . which is a facially improper FOIA request.”  “Because the plaintiffs requested that the defendant clarify or define an agency term rather than produce an actual record, the defendant was likewise not required to respond to this request.”