Gannett Satellite Info. Network, LLC v. DOJ, No. 22-475, 2023 WL 2682121 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023) (Howell, J.)

Gannett Satellite Info. Network, LLC v. DOJ, No. 22-475, 2023 WL 2682121 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023) (Howell, J.)

Re:  Request for “data regarding ‘individual-level information on the deaths of incarcerated people in the custody of local jails, state prisons, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons’”

Disposition:  Granting plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment; denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment

• Exemption 3:  “Employing all tools of statutory construction, the clear text of the confidentiality provision in Title I of the Crime Control Act plainly does not exempt release of information ‘furnished under’ or gathered pursuant to the Death in Custody Reporting Act [(“DCRA”)].”  “As such, DOJ wrongfully withheld information requested by plaintiff under FOIA Exemption 3.”  At issue is the application of the DCRA, Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 34 U.S.C. and 14 U.S.C.).  The court relates that “[t]he parties do not dispute that the Crime Control Act’s Title I confidentiality provision is an exemption that qualifies for withholding under FOIA’s Exemption 3 – rightfully so, because it undoubtedly is.”  “Thus, the dispositive question, which no court has apparently yet encountered, is whether the requested records submitted to DOJ, as required by the DCRA, are covered by the Title I confidentiality provision, i.e., whether those requested records are ‘furnished under’ Title I of the Crime Control Act.”  “The Crime Control Act, enacted in 1968 over thirty years earlier than the DCRA, sought ‘[t]o assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of government, and for other purposes.’”  “At issue in this dispute is Title I of the Act, named “Law Enforcement Assistance,” intended “to assist State and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at every level by national assistance.” The court relates that “[s]tarting with the text, the key language of Title I's confidentiality provision is as follows:  ‘[N]o officer or employee of the Federal Government, and no recipient of assistance under the provisions of this title shall use or reveal any research or statistical information furnished under this title by any person and identifiable to any specific private person for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was obtained in accordance with this title.’”  “‘Of this title’ most clearly refers to Title I, so the plain text of the provision states that its confidentiality requirement only applies to information ‘furnished under’ Title I.”  The court relates that “DOJ defends the use of Exemption 3 because ‘States are required to furnish [the requested information] only be virtue of their voluntary participation in a Title I program, the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program’ and because states ‘furnish[ ]’ that information to a Title I entity, [the Bureau of Justice Statistics], the relevant data is ‘furnished under’ Title I of the Crime Control Act and so the confidentiality provision applies.”  “Defendant’s reading of the statute is far too strained.”  “The confidentiality provision’s plain text applies to information and data ‘furnished under’ Title I and because the requested information was ‘furnished under’ or ‘pursuant to’ the DCRA, the confidentiality provision is inapplicable to the requested data and thus defendant may not withhold the DCRA documents under Exemption.”  The court finds that “[t]he statistics plaintiff requests are ‘furnished under’ the DCRA because they were provided by state and federal law enforcement agencies subject to the requirements of that statute.”  “The DCRA mandated the submission of such death-in-custody information to DOJ, the timeframe for such submissions, the specific details necessary for reporting, and the penalty for states’ failure to comply with the DCRA’s requirements.”  “Information provided to DOJ is thus subject to the DCRA’s requirements.”  “Those reporting requirements were not enacted as an amendment to the Crime Control Act but as stand-alone legislation and thus are not even codified as part of Title I, and so the sought-after information is not provided pursuant to Title I.”  “Defined by defendant as ‘subject to,’ as did plaintiff, defendant seizes on the DCRA’s enforcement mechanism to argue that ‘[s]tates are subject to the reporting requirement of DCRA only because of their participation in, and the requirements of, the Byrne Grant program.’”  “Yet, Congress's choice of the DCRA’s enforcement mechanism does not do the work defendant wishes with the result of overlaying the rest of the Crime Control Act's Title I on the DCRA.”  “Such a reading is simply neither apparent nor supported by the confidentiality provision’s clear text.”
  
  Regarding the structure of the statute, the court finds that “[i]n context, Title I of the Crime Control Act does not cover the specific death-in-custody reporting requirements provided in the DCRA – Title I’s purview includes financial assistance to state law enforcement programs, independent from the DCRA’s reporting requirements.”  “Additionally, reading Title I as the vehicle for the production of death-in-custody information to DOJ, as defendant seeks to do, impermissibly expands Title I’s scope in that the statute provides funding for state and local governments whereas the DCRA imposes reporting requirements on both state and federal governments.”  “Defendant’s reading of the statute also does not account for its incompatible effect on related provisions.”
  
  Regarding the purposes of the statutes, the court finds that “the text of Title I’s confidentiality provision is plain and clear, and for good measure, the divergent purposes of the Crime Control Act and the DCRA confirm that interpretation.”  “The Crime Control Act aimed ‘[t]o assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of government, and for other purposes.’”  “Conversely, the DCRA sought to ‘encourage States to report to the Attorney General certain information regarding the deaths of individuals in the custody of law enforcement agencies.’”  “Overall, though not dispositive, the stark difference between the purpose of Title I’s confidentiality provision in the Crime Control Act, to assist law enforcement, and the focus on transparency, accountability, and oversight of custodial institutions at the heart of the DCRA further supports the plain text of the provision and its inability to exempt release of plaintiff’s requested data.”
  
  “As a final note, the legislative history of Title I of the Crime Control Act further confirms the statute’s plain text meaning.”  “Since its enactment in 1968, Title I has been amended numerous times and in those instances, Congress has not mentioned any applicability of the Title's confidentiality provision to the DCRA.”  “Additionally, the DCRA in its original form enacted in 2000 made no reference to Title I, . . . showing that Congress intended this law to stand as its own set of requirements regardless of Title I’s requirements and structure”