Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., No. 18-00646, 2019 WL 2342949 (D.D.C. June 3, 2019) (McFadden, J.)

Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., No. 18-00646, 2019 WL 2342949 (D.D.C. June 3, 2019) (McFadden, J.)

Re:  Request for site-inspection reports and other inspection records for specific animal dealers and exhibitor

Disposition:  Granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary judgment; granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

• Exemption 6:  "[T]he Court finds that while the licensees and third parties [of homestead facilities – businesses co-located with the owner's personal residence –] have a substantial privacy interest in their names, addresses, contact information, and personally identifying information, they have only a de minimis privacy interest in the other information withheld from the reports."  "Thus, the Service must disclose all reasonably segregable portions of the records that do not include names, signatures, addresses, images, or contact and identifying information of the licensees and third-parties."  The court explains that "[t]he bulk of the Service's withholding are improper under Exemption 6 because the information does not implicate the licensee's personal privacy interest."  "For example, the reports' narrative sections contain the inspector's observations, and 'if appropriate, indicates any deficiencies, documents noncompliant items, and cites the applicable regulation, a description of the problem, and a deadline to correct the non-compliant item.'"  "The Service has failed to convincingly explain how that information trammels on the licensees' personal privacy."  The court finds that "unlike the 'names, home addresses, telephone numbers, GPS coordinates of homes, and information from which financial information could be gleaned' . . . details about a business's compliance with regulations and statutes do not relate to intimate personal details, only business activities."  However, "[t]he Court finds that licensees retain more than a de minimis privacy interest in their home addresses, even though the interest may be diminished by the mixed nature of the address."  "Privacy concerns are especially strong when a FOIA request is directed at only a few homestead businesses because it increases the risk that the business-nature of the address is not the purpose for the request."  "Because the licensees and third-parties [of homestead facilities] have a significant privacy interest in their names, addresses, and personally identifying information, and because there is no public interest in that information, the balancing is easy."  "'[S]omething . . . outweighs nothing every time.'"  "The Service properly withheld the licensees' addresses and the names of third-party veterinarians under Exemption 6."
  
  Interestingly, the court relates that "the Service argues that the [non-homestead facilities – businesses not co-located with the owner's personal residence –] licensees have privacy interests in the narrative sections because linking the licensees' names – which the Service already disclosed – with descriptions of noncompliant conduct can invite harassment and stigma."  Defendant cites as an example "a dog breeder from Missouri [who] stated that he had received harassing phone calls after the Humane Society released his phone number."  The court finds that while "courts may consider hearsay in FOIA cases when assessing the adequacy of the agency's search[,]" "[a]nd FOIA declarants may rely on information obtained through inter-agency consultation[,]" "it is a different matter to rely on out-of-court statements from private third-parties to justify an agency's withholding."  The court finds that "[w]ithout the accounts of harassment from the licensees, the declaration's justification for withholding the information is reduced to speculation and summary accounts of the hearsay."
   
• Exemption 7, Threshold & Exemption 7(C):  "On balance, the Court finds that releasing information other than the licensee's addresses and third parties' names could not 'reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.'"  The court does find that "[t]hese inspection reports relate to the Service's responsibility to enforce the [Animal Welfare Act] and ensure compliance by licensees, not oversight of employees."  "Routine inspection reports may not be 'investigatory,' but there is a 'rational nexus' between the reports and the Service's law enforcement duties."  "But even under Exemption 7(C)'s broader standard, the Service's withholding of the narratives and descriptions of noncompliant conduct is improper."
   
• Litigation Considerations, "Reasonably Segregable" Requirements:  "While some of the Service's withholdings were improper, the Court is satisfied by [defendant's] declaration and its Vaughn Index that the agency has otherwise met its obligation to segregate non-exempt material from the records."  "The Service 'conducted a line-by-line analysis of each responsive document to determine whether any non-exempt material could be released,' and '[w]here reasonably segregable non-exempt material was identified, it was released.'"