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Kwoka v. IRS, No. 19-5310, 2021 WL 865347 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) (Tatel, J.)

Date

Kwoka v. IRS, No. 19-5310, 2021 WL 865347 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) (Tatel, J.)

Re:  Request for nine categories of information about each FOIA request received by IRS in Fiscal Year 2015

Disposition:  Vacating district court's denial of requester's motion for attorney fees and remanding for further proceedings

  • Attorney Fees, Eligibility:  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit relates that "[i]n evaluating a fee petition, the district court assesses whether the plaintiff 'substantially prevailed' within the meaning of the statute."  "Here, the district court found [the requester] had done so, a conclusion the IRS does not contest." 
     
  • Attorney Fees, Entitlement:  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit notes that, "[i]n this case, the district court weighed the first factor in [the requester's] favor."  "Although the parties spar over the proper magnitude the district court gave or should have given to that factor, the IRS does not argue that the court abused its discretion by finding 'some benefit to the public' from the lawsuit."  However, contrary to the district court, "[the court] agree[s] with [the requester] that the second and third factors – 'commercial benefit' and 'plaintiff's interest' – support a fee award."  The court explains that "[the requester] undoubtedly has a serious, scholarly interest in how federal agencies administer FOIA."  "She has published articles about FOIA in the Yale and Duke Law Journals . . . and her work has been cited by multiple circuit courts."  "Additionally, she has either testified about FOIA or presented her research to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Securities and Exchange Commission's FOIA Office, and the National Archives and Records Administration's FOIA Advisory Committee, while also previously serving on the latter committee as Co-Chair of the Proactive Disclosures Subcommittee."  "And especially relevant here, she says that she will soon publish a book with Cambridge University Press featuring her analysis of the very information she obtained in this case."  '"[N]ews interests, regardless of private incentive, generally should not be considered commercial interests,' and the second and third factors 'generally' should weigh in favor of scholars and journalists unless their interest 'was of a frivolous or purely commercial nature.'"  "Moreover, the IRS does not contend that [the requester's] interest was 'frivolous' or 'purely commercial.'"  Regarding the fourth factor, the court finds that, "[o]n this issue, [its] review is especially deferential."  "'The question for us is whether the District Court reasonably (even if incorrectly) concluded that the agency reasonably (even if incorrectly) withheld documents.'"  "But even this 'double dose of deference,' . . . cannot save the district court's conclusion with respect to section 6103."  "To begin with, the IRS failed to give any logical explanation as to how someone could reliably infer taxpayer identities from the vast majority of the information [the requester] sought."  "As the district court pointed out, even many of the hypotheticals posed by the IRS made no sense on their own terms."  "Moreover, one of the IRS's own summary judgment declarations admitted that 'some' of [the requester's] 'requests for non-tax records likely do not implicate significant privacy interests' and are therefore 'non-exempt.'"  "From the beginning of this litigation, then, the IRS knew that at least some of the information [the requester] sought was not subject to section 6103."  "Lacking basis in either logic or fact, the IRS's argument that section 6103 exempted all of the requested information was plainly unreasonable."  "This, however, does not end the matter, as the district court never addressed the IRS's other argument – that at the time of [the requester's] initial request, it reasonably believed that segregating the exempt and non-exempt materials would impose an unreasonable burden."  "The district court, however, never answered the question critical to [the requester's] fee request."  "Even though it found at the summary judgment stage that processing the records for redactions imposed no unreasonable burden, the question at the fee stage is whether the IRS 'had a reasonable basis in law' when it 'initially' concluded otherwise."  "Accordingly, because our role is to 'review the district court's attorney's fees determination only for abuse of discretion,' . . . we shall follow our court's consistent practice and remand to the district court to evaluate the reasonableness of the IRS's burden argument in the first instance and then to re-balance the four factors in view of our conclusion that factors two and three weigh in [the requester's] favor."
Court Decision Topic(s)
Court of Appeals opinions
Attorney Fees
Updated March 31, 2021