Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. Wolf, No. 20-2348, 2024 WL 4227617 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2024) (Friedrich, J.)

Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. Wolf, No. 20-2348, 2024 WL 4227617 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2024) (Friedrich, J.)

Re:  Requests for records concerning training of immigration-related federal employees, mostly asylum officers

Disposition:  Denying plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees

• Attorney Fees, Eligibility:  The court finds that “[t]he commencement of this litigation is the most natural explanation for the sudden movement on [plaintiff’s] FOIA request.”  “Here, the agencies do not offer a plausible alternative explanation for the immediate action on [plaintiff’s] FOIA request, other than that a backlog of FOIA requests postponed their pre-filing response.” “But despite the backlog, the agencies turned to [plaintiff’s] requests as soon as this litigation commenced.” “The Court thus concludes that [plaintiff] ‘substantially prevailed’ and is eligible for attorney’s fees.”
   
• Attorney Fees, Entitlement:  “Balancing these factors, [the court finds that] [plaintiff] is entitled to a fee award.”  “The parties agree that the first factor favors [plaintiff].”  “On balance, the second and third factors favor the plaintiff.”  “[Plaintiff] holds itself out as a ‘nonprofit organization’ that works on the public-interest project of analyzing and fighting ‘gender-based violence.’”  “The government raises a question as to [plaintiff’s] status as a non-profit organization, noting that i[t] has not registered as such with the IRS.”  “There is no evidence, however, that [plaintiff] is a well-resourced private company or is primarily seeking disclosure to obtain a commercial benefit.” “Moreover, there is no tension between [plaintiff’s] status as an LLC and its claim that it is a ‘nonprofit organization’ – under the D.C. Code, an LLC ‘may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit.’”  “Thus, [plaintiff] passes the test’s second and third factors.”
  
  “The government also posits, as it has done in earlier cases, . . . that [plaintiff] is a front for the collection of attorney’s fees . . . .”  “[Plaintiff] has filed an eyebrow-raising number of FOIA suits like this one.” “Indeed, the list of such cases in the government’s opposition brief is longer than the explanation of work [plaintiff] has provided in both the complaint and on its website – combined.” “[Plaintiff] also has done a poor job of explaining how it furthers its mission of ‘raising awareness about immigrant women who have suffered from gender-based violence such as female genital mutilation (FGM), rape, domestic violence, and forced marriage’ and helping women who seek asylum.”  “It appears that [plaintiff] merely uploads to its website various records that it obtains from FOIA cases and offers no analysis of the records.”  “Nor does [plaintiff] appear to offer any other assistance to immigrant women, such as housing or other support.”  “When directed by the Court to ‘explain[ ] the specific ways in which [plaintiff] furthers its asserted mission,’ . . . [plaintiff’s] counsel referred the Court to articles he has written that discuss records produced in similar FOIA suits and to third parties’ discussions of [plaintiff’s] successful FOIA requests . . . .”  “On this meager record, it is hard to discern how immigrant women benefit from [plaintiff’s] work.”  “Even so, the government has fallen short in substantiating its theory that [plaintiff] is a front for the collection of attorney’s fees, and therefore ‘the Court will not address it further.’”
  
  “Last, the fourth factor favors the government.” “Throughout the parties’ negotiations, each party registered complaints and made concessions.”  “But the Court sees nothing that rose to the level of obduracy on the part of the government.”  “Moreover, [plaintiff] has dropped any contests to the government’s remaining withholdings, suggesting that it has ceded that no valid claims remain.”
   
• Attorney Fees, Calculations:  First, the court holds that “[t]he determination of the rate is a straightforward matter.”  “The parties agree that the Fitzpatrick Matrix supplies the applicable rates.” “Only one dispute about the rate remains.”  “[Plaintiff] submits that the Court should apply the 2024 rate for hours in all foregoing years, as compensation for the delay in payment . . . ; the government contend historical rates apply . . . .”  “On this issue, the Court has no discretion.”  “The Supreme Court has made it plain that absent an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity, attorneys’ fees awarded against the federal government must be based on historical rates.”  “Accordingly, the Court will apply the following historical rates, which reflect the Fitzpatrick Matrix rates for a lawyer with over 35 years of experience: 2020 ($731.00/hour); 2021 ($736.00/hour); 2022 ($760.00/hour); 2023 ($807.00/hour).”
  
  “Although [plaintiff] is eligible for attorney’s fees, the Court will decline to award it any fees because its request is patently unreasonable.”  “[Plaintiff] has failed to [meet its burden] here.” “Its fee request is not only grossly excessive, it is plagued with deficiencies and, most gravely, flouts multiple courts’ reprimands of counsel’s inappropriate billing practices.”  “When a plaintiff submits an outrageously unreasonable request, a court may decline to award fees as a means of sanctioning attorney misconduct and deterring similar behavior.”  “The deficiencies in [plaintiff’s] fee request fall broadly into two categories.”  “The first is that the time records are vague, inadequately descriptive, or made in error.”  “[Certain] omissions fall short of the standard for accurate and standardized billing.”  “The second categorical deficiency with [plaintiff’s] fee request is that it is grossly out of line with requests in similar cases, reflecting an extraordinary lack of billing judgment.”  “Across the board, [plaintiff] has failed to justify the deficiencies of its award request.” “Its reply brief is as disorganized as its submission of claimed hours.”  “Rather than address the agencies’ arguments point by point, counsel repeatedly deflects, randomly rebutting just a few with skeletal responses.” “Furthermore, this is not the first time that [plaintiff’s] counsel has been reprimanded for his improper billing practices.”  “Last year, Judge McFadden reduced [plaintiff’s] fees in another FOIA case by 40%, citing ‘significant inefficiencies and a lack of billing judgment.’”  “Just a couple of months ago, Judge Bates imposed a 50% reduction on [plaintiff], citing ‘improperly and excessively billed time.’”  “Rather than addressing the same deficiencies that other judges on this Court have identified, counsel continues to engage in the same pattern of overbilling.”  “Moreover, his fee requests have increased over time, even as his substantive legal workload has decreased.”  “Aside from tweaking a previously-filed complaint and signing a series of largely government-produced status reports, counsel performed minimal work in this case, far less than what would support an award of $249,452 in fees.” “Counsel’s practice of increasing his fee requests following court-imposed reductions to his earlier requests smacks of the kind of bad-faith bargaining tactic properly deterred by the denial of a fee award.”  “As the D.C. Circuit has emphasized, ‘overbilling the government [is] a serious transgression, damaging to the public fisc and violative of the trust reposed in each member of the bar.’”  “A court has discretion to entirely deny a ‘request for an outrageously unreasonable amount, lest claimants feel free to make unreasonable demands, knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such misconduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked for in the first place.’”  “[Plaintiff’s] counsel not only demands a sum that is plainly excessive for this relatively simple litigation, he also engages in the same unreasonable and improper billing practices for which he has been admonished repeatedly by this Court.” “Because [plaintiff’s] counsel continues to submit increasingly exaggerated fee requests, the Court will exercise its discretion to deny attorney’s fees ‘as a means of encouraging counsel to maintain adequate records and submit reasonable, carefully calculated and conscientiously measured claims.’”