Love v. DOJ, No. 13-1303, 2015 WL 5063166 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2015) (Chutkan, J.)

Love v. DOJ, No. 13-1303, 2015 WL 5063166 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2015) (Chutkan, J.)

Re: Request for records concerning plaintiff's criminal case

Disposition: Granting defendant's motion for summary judgment

• Exemption 7(D), Glomar:  "[T]he Court will grant summary judgment to DEA on its application of exemption 7(D)."  The court finds that, "[s]ince coded informants 'are expressly assured confidentiality of their identities and the information they provide to DEA,' . . . DEA properly invoked exemption 7(D) in response to plaintiff's request for records pertaining 'to an individual [ ] plaintiff claim[ed][was] a coded confidential informant.'"  Regarding implied confidentiality, the court finds that plaintiff "has conceded the nature of the investigation and the asserted danger inherent in prosecuting a case such as the one against plaintiff, which involved charges of 'solicitation of murder for hire and possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver.'"  Additionally, "the Court finds that plaintiff has not made the requisite showing of prior disclosure to defeat summary judgment on DEA's Glomar response."  The court relates that "[p]laintiff proffers documents from his criminal case in Lake County, Illinois, . . . none of which is a DEA record or a record of any federal agency."
   
• Exemption 7(C):  "[T]he Court finds summary judgment warranted on DEA's redaction of identifying information under exemption 7(C)."  The court relates that "DEA withheld the identities of DEA Special Agents and other law enforcement officers at the federal, state and local levels, reasoning that disclosure 'would place [them] in a position that they may suffer undue invasions of privacy, harassment and humiliation[.]'"  The court finds that "DEA has clearly articulated a privacy interest sufficient to invoke exemption 7(C)."  In response to plaintiff's public interest arguments, the court finds that "[e]ven if true, the misconduct of Illinois officials is irrelevant to FOIA's central purpose of exposing to public scrutiny the performance of federal agencies in carrying out their statutory duties."  The court finds that "[s]ince plaintiff has made no evidentiary showing of misconduct by DEA, there is no 'counterweight on the FOIA scale for [the] court to balance against the cognizable privacy interests in the requested records.'"
   
• Exemption 7(E):  The court finds that defendant's use of Exemption 7(E) was appropriate.  The court relates that "DEA withheld under this exemption G–DEP codes and NADDIS numbers, which are 'identifiers [that] relate[ ] solely to internal DEA practices and can only be legitimately utilized by agency personnel functioning within the agency.'"  "The codes and numbers 'reflect procedures prescribed by the DEA Agents Manual,' which 'sets forth the practices and guidelines used by DEA special agents' and others involved in gathering and documenting activities during the course of a criminal investigation."  The court finds that "[p]laintiff has not seriously contested DEA's reliance on exemption 7(E), and the redaction of such codes and numbers has been routinely upheld."
   
• Litigation Considerations, "Reasonably Segregable" Requirements:  The court holds that "[p]laintiff has not seriously contested this aspect of DEA's declaration, which 'show[s] with 'reasonably specificity' why the [subject] documents cannot be further segregated.'"  The court relates that "DEA's declarant avers that '[a]ll of the responsive information was examined to determine whether any reasonably segregable information could be released.'"