Magassa v. FBI, No. 23-5235, 2024 WL 5221092 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 2024) (per curiam)

Magassa v. FBI, No. 23-5235, 2024 WL 5221092 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 2024) (per curiam)

Re: Request for records concerning requester

Disposition:  Affirming district court’s grant of government’s motion for summary judgment and denial of requester’s motion for summary judgment

• Litigation Considerations, Evidentiary Showing, Adequacy of Search:  “[The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit] agree[s] that the FBI’s search was adequate.”  “[The FBI] stated that [it] conducted a search using [the requester’s] full name, along with a ‘three-way phonetic breakdown.’”  “The agency searched the ‘Sentinel’ and ‘Automated Case Support’ databases, procedures that check hundreds of millions of documents.” “While this issue would be clearer if [the FBI] had stated that these databases were ‘the only possible place[s] that responsive records [were] likely to be located,’ the FBI’s explanation is sufficient for [the court] to conclude that ‘no other record system was likely to produce responsive documents.’”  “Notably, the databases in question include ‘all FBI generated records’ created since 2012 as well as all ‘pertinent investigative information’ from before 2012.” “And we have previously held that nearly identical searches suffice.”  “[The requester] has provided only ‘purely speculative claims’ about missing documents.”
   
• Exemption 3:  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holds that “[t]he district court also correctly upheld the application of three FOIA exemptions to these records.”  “First, the FBI properly redacted records under FOIA Exemption 3, which permits withholding if a matter is ‘specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.’”  “The National Security Act’s protection of ‘intelligence sources and methods’ is one such statutory exemption.”  “Having reviewed the first . . . declaration and the FBI’s ex parte submission, [the court] believe[s] the agency has sufficiently explained that the documents relate to qualifying law enforcement techniques and procedures.”
   
• Exemption 7(C): “Second, [the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holds that] the FBI also properly applied Exemption 7(C) to redact the names of law enforcement personnel.”  “FBI personnel have ‘cognizable privacy interest[s]’ under Exemption 7(C), . . . so [the court’s] only question is whether there is a public interest that outweighs the privacy interest.”  “But even assuming that [the requester’s] identified public interest in ‘understanding the FBI’s operations and activities’ is cognizable under 7(C), . . . he provides no explanation for how the names of FBI employees would advance that goal.”
   
• Exemption 7(E): “Third, [the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holds that] the district court properly upheld the FBI’s application of Exemption 7(E).”  “At issue here is information about the FBI’s operations, including internal websites, case file numbers, information collection methods, polygraph examination practices, and details of specific investigations.”  “The first . . . declaration adequately explained how these information categories could plausibly lead to circumvention of the law by alerting the subjects of investigations or informing would-be criminals about how to evade law enforcement.”  “For those reasons, [the court has] previously upheld similar redactions under Exemption 7(E).”
  
  Additionally, the court holds that “[t]he district court correctly approved the FBI’s ‘Glomar response.’”  “[The requester] seeks information about his presence or nonpresence on FBI terrorism watchlists.”  “The second . . . declaration explained that those records’ existence or nonexistence would fall within Exemption 7(E).”  “It stated that the program would be less effective if watchlist membership could be ascertained, as individuals could then ‘avoid detection or develop countermeasures.’”  “Moreover, a hostile actor could aggregate watchlist placements to ‘construct a picture’ of nonpublic watchlist criteria . . . and ‘adjust their behavior to avoid being identified as a threat[]’ . . . .”  “These detailed justifications more than meet the low plausibility bar [the court] require[s] under Exemption 7(E).”