Parker v. ICE, No. 15-1253, 2017 WL 829098 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2017) (Contreras, J.)

Parker v. ICE, No. 15-1253, 2017 WL 829098 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2017) (Contreras, J.)

Re: Request for records concerning criminal investigation of plaintiff

Disposition: Granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary judgment; denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

• Exemption 7, Threshold: "The Court thus credits ICE's assertion that all of the relevant records were compiled for law enforcement purposes and that Exemption 7's threshold requirement has been met." The court relates that "ICE asserts that it meets this threshold requirement because 'the Secretary of Homeland Security is charged with the administration and enforcement of laws relating to the Customs and the importation and exportation of goods in the country' and 'ICE . . . is responsible for identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities within the nation's borders . . . that threaten national security and public safety.'" Additionally, "[t]he specific 'records at issue in this matter were compiled as part of a criminal investigation by . . . [the] U.S. Customs Service.'"
   

• Exemption 7(C): "The Court . . . finds that the privacy interests of the ICE employees justify withholding their personal information because revealing personal data about relatively low-level employees would not significantly inform the public about what the government was up to, and grants ICE summary judgment as to its use of Exemption 7(C)." The court relates that "ICE uses Exemption 7(C) to justify withholding the names, initials, signatures, and phone numbers of ICE employees and third-party individuals." "ICE may also have withheld email addresses and room numbers of ICE employees under Exemption 7(C)." The court finds that "the individuals and ICE employees do clearly have a privacy interest as the names, addresses, and phone numbers redacted could be linked to them and potentially expose them to harassment[]" and "[plaintiff] does not articulate a public interest in learning personal information about the ICE agents or third-party individuals mentioned in these documents."
   

• Exemption 7(E): "The Court . . . approves ICE's use of Exemption 7(E)." The court finds that "[t]he 'sensitive database and event codes, identification numbers, law enforcement system URLs, internal website links, record identification numbers, event numbers, category codes, TECS codes, method codes, file numbers, . . . status codes, internal agency codes, case numbers, program codes, and system codes' withheld by ICE create . . . a chance of a reasonably expected risk of circumvention of the law." "The Court agrees that disclosing this information could reasonably be expected to create a risk of circumvention by revealing how ICE's databases work and rendering them more vulnerable to manipulation."
   

• Litigation Considerations, "Reasonable Segregable" Requirements: The court relates that "ICE's declaration states that their employees 'reviewed each record line-by-line to identify information exempt from disclosure' and released all reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions." "Given that '[a]gencies are entitled to a presumption that they complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material,' . . . and that [plaintiff] does not dispute ICE's release of reasonably segregable material, the Court grants ICE summary judgment on its obligation to release all non-exempt portions of records."
   

• Litigation Considerations, Adequacy of Search: "The Court agrees that ICE's search is not inadequate simply because it has not located communications with the FBI, but denies ICE summary judgment as to the adequacy of its email search because it does not provide sufficient detail about the search terms used to search [an] Agent['s] email or the backup system that potentially contains [the] Agent['s] email." On the first issue, the court finds that "[plaintiff's] conjecture about the possible existence of other documents fails to show that the agency's search was inadequate." On the second point, the court finds that "ICE indeed provides no details about the method of the search for [the] Agent[’s] email, except that it involved 'searches of his personal Outlook email archives.'" "It is not enough for the agency to conclusorily state that it searched relevant records, . . . instead, the agency must provide additional detail, including the search terms used." Additionally, while the court finds that it is true that "[i]f [the agent's] emails exist, it is only within the archives from before 2008, which the agency now claims are inaccessible." However, the court finds "that ICE must provide more information about the backup systems that may contain [the] email[s]." The court relates that "[t]he D.C. Circuit has required that an agency 'inform the court and plaintiffs whether backup tapes of any potential relevance exist' and 'whether there is any practical obstacle to searching them.'"