Vidal-Martinez v. ICE, No. 20-7772, 2022 WL 2181427 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2022) (Kennelly, J.)

Vidal-Martinez v. ICE, No. 20-7772, 2022 WL 2181427 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2022) (Kennelly, J.)

Re:  Request for Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") emails regarding plaintiff

Disposition:  Granting defendants' motion for summary judgment; denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

• Exemption 5:  "[T]he (b)(5) exemption protects documents that are 'normally privileged in the civil discovery context.'"  "[Plaintiff's] main argument in support of his contention that these emails are not privileged is that the crime-fraud exception applies."  "[T]he Court concludes that the crime-fraud exception is inapplicable."  "The relevant portions of the emails consist of conversations between [defendant ICE's] attorneys and a Decatur County prosecutor discussing whether and how to transfer [plaintiff] to the county for his criminal proceedings."  "[Defendant's] attorneys discuss the benefits of transferring him—namely, they believed a conviction in the state court cases would strengthen [defendant's] case for deportation."  "They also opine that [plaintiff's] transfer to Decatur County would result in the federal court losing jurisdiction over the habeas corpus case."  "This was not the case, as the court later concluded, but there is no evidence that [Defendant] deliberately misled the court when it argued that the habeas case should be dismissed." 
  
  "[Plaintiff] also contends that the work-product privilege and deliberate process privileges do not apply to certain withheld items because these privileges protect only predecisional documents and some of the emails were sent after the decision to transfer him was made."  "Although [defendant] reached out to Decatur County on September 14, 2020, it had not yet decided to transfer him at that point."  "According to the communications, it was not until September 18, 2020, that Decatur County confirmed that it would file the petition for a writ and seek [plaintiff's] transfer."  "The Court thus concludes that the disputed communications were predecisional and therefore privileged."
   
• Exemptions 6 & 7(C):  "Again, [plaintiff] argues that the exemptions do not apply because they do not protect government impropriety."  "As previously discussed, however, the Court did not find any evidence of impropriety in the disputed emails."  "The Court thus overrules this argument." 
  
  "[Plaintiff] also argues that these exemptions do not apply because the privacy interest cited by ICE is outweighed by the public interest in knowing the government is properly litigating constitutional and habeas corpus matters."  "The problem with this argument is that [plaintiff] does not sufficiently explain how disclosure of the redacted material would further the stated public interest."  "The disputed withholdings under the (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) exemptions contained the names of the government employees . . . who participated in the communications."  "It is hard to see how knowing the names of these individuals would assist in determining whether the government properly litigated [plaintiff's] habeas corpus case."  "Accordingly, the Court overrules this argument."
   
• ​​​​​​​Litigation Considerations, "Reasonably Segregable" Requirements:  "[T]he agency must still disclose all segregable information."  "[Plaintiff] contends that [defendant] failed to meet this requirement."  "The Court disagrees."  "[Defendant] disclosed all segregable information."  "The redactions were line-by-line and specific and the agency did not withhold any more than justified under the statutory exemptions."