With respect to proving that the defendant had knowledge of the federal warrant, it is clear that the government may establish such knowledge by inference. United States v. Gros, 824 F.2d 1487, 1496 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985) ("Direct proof of knowledge of the existence of a warrant is rarely available. The knowledge element can be established by evidence from which the jury can properly infer knowledge and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 848 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985); United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1961) (inference of knowledge from the act of harboring itself). Additionally, it is no defense to a Section 1071 prosecution that the defendant was made aware of a warrant that was not actually outstanding at the time, when another outstanding warrant existed. United States v. Bissonette, 586 F.2d 73, 77 (8th Cir. 1978). However, the knowledge element cannot be satisfied merely by proof that the defendant was "willfully blind" as to the existence of a warrant. United States v. Wyatt, 807 F.2d 1480, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hogg, 670 F.2d 1358, 1362 (4th Cir. 1982).
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