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Tim Brennan Presentation

Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Single Firm Conduct: Predatory Buying Panel
Tim Brennan

2006: T.D. MacDonald Chair in Industrial Economics
Competition Bureau, Industry Canada

Permanent: Professor, Public Policy and Economics
University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC

brennan.tim@cb-bc.gc.ca, brennan@umbc.edu
FTC Headquarters
Washington, DC
June 22, 2006

Recommendations

  • Predation or Exclusion? Pick one or the other.
  • Validate necessary assumptions in those rare predatory buying cases.
  • For exclusion, first delineate complement market, using HMGs.
  • Then, establish price effect from complementary marketmonopolization (CMM).
  • Test discounts by effect on complement price, not comparison to cost.
  • Predation screens用rofit sacrifice, equally efficient competitor,even prior dominance妖o not belong in exclusion cases.
  • Consider share-based rather than all-or-nothing remedies.
  • Focus on creation of new monopolies, not maintenance of old ones.
Brennan: DOJ/FTC Predatory Buying Panel June 22, 2006 2

 

Updated December 29, 2023