| | Overview
Table of Contents |
| I. | Background |
| II. | Microsoft Possesses Monopoly Power Over Operating Systems |
| III. | Alternative Platform-Level Technologies, Especially Internet Browsers and Java, |
| IV. | Microsoft Attempted To Enter Market-Division Agreements To Eliminate Platform-Level Software Threatened Microsoft's Operating System Monopoly |
| | A. | Microsoft tried to eliminate the browser threat by proposing a naked market-division agreement to Netscape |
| | B. | Microsoft's proposal of market-division agreements to eliminate other |
| V. | Microsoft Engaged In A Predatory Campaign To Crush The Browser Threat To Its |
| | A. | After Netscape refused Microsoft's offer to divide the browser market, |
| | B. | Microsoft tied its Internet Explorer browser to Windows 95 and Windows 98 in |
| | C. | Microsoft imposed a variety of other anticompetitive restraints on the OEM |
| | D. | Microsoft entered into anticompetitive and exclusionary agreements with OLSs |
| | E. | Microsoft entered into anticompetitive and exclusionary agreements with OLSs |
| | F. | Microsoft entered into exclusionary agreements with other firms that |
| | G. | Microsoft set a predatory price for Internet Explorer |
| VI. | Microsoft Used Predatory and Anticompetitive Conduct to Impede Other Platform |
| | A. | Microsoft responded to the threat that Java posed to the applications barrier to |
| | B. | Microsoft engaged in predatory, anticompetitive conduct to induce Intel to |
| VII. | Through its predatory and anticompetitive conduct, Microsoft has maintained its |
| | A. | Microsoft's campaign to blunt the browser threat further entrenched |
| | B. | Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct created a dangerous probability that |
| | C. | AOL's acquisition of Netscape will not undo the harm to competition caused by |
| | D. | Microsoft's entire course of conduct has caused, and will continue to cause, |
| | E. | Microsoft's course of conduct has caused, and will continue to cause, |