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Microsoft Tunney Act Comment : Ramon G. Pantin

Scalio, Inc.

Tel: (425)889-8553
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FAX COVER SHEET

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To:
Name: Antitrust Division
Office Number: Microsoft Settlement
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Fax Number: 202-307-1454
From:
Name: Ramon Patin
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Ramon G. Pantin

From: "Ramon G. Pantin" rgp@scalio.com
To: Microsoft.atr@usdoj.gov
Cc: rgp@veritas.com
Sent: Sunday, January 27, 2002 11:59 PM
Attach: commenls-040.html
Subject: Microsoft Settlement

Dear Department of Justice representative,

Attached is an HTML document with my comments about the settlement proposed. I have included my background and contact information in that document.

Please feel free to contact me at:
    rgp@scalio.com
or at home at:
    425-889-1043
if you have trouble with the attached documents.

Sincerily,
Ramon G. Pantin


Introduction


My name is Ramon G. Pantin, I have been in involved in commercial Operating System development since 1989. I have worked on the design and implementation of a large variety of Operating Systems and system software (operating system components) including chronologically:

I have also taught operating systems design classes at Universidad Simon Bolivar (Venezuela) in 1989 and professional system software classes, both for UNIX and Windows NT.

I consider myself eminently well versed as a software enginner with 12 years of hands on operating system design and development.

The issues herein are of great importance to me and the industry that I am a participant of.

I appreciate the opportunity to comment about the proposed settlement.

Below is a long list of comments.  Each comment's name is of the form "Comment X.Y" where X is the major section of the proposed settlement within which the commented terms are discussed, and Y is simply a sequential number of the comments that I have written and it is actually independent of the acutal comment numbering within the proposed settlement itself.  Each comment includes the appropriate reference to text in question within the proposed settlement document.

I am available for comment and clarification in any and all issues hereing, preferrably thorugh email, please contact me at:

or at:

Sincerily,

Comment III.1 

Section III.A reads:

There are 3 problems with this section:

  1. It allows Microsoft to withhold existing forms of non-monetary Consideration, because it only prevents witholding newly introduced forms;
  2. Monetary considerations are explicitly excluded, they shouldn't be excluded.
  3. Microsoft knowledge is irrelevant and hard to establish, that text only contributes to the ambiguity of this section.

Section III.A should be not be constrained or qualified in these ways. It should be replaced with this text:

Comment III.2

Section III.A.1 reads:

There are 2 problems in this section:

  1. Microsoft in the past has retaliated against OEMs that market products that compete against Microsoft products, not just Microsoft Platform Software. For example, Microsoft retaliated against IBM when IBM decided to pre-install its SmartSuite product (a product that competes directly with Microsoft Office) on its PCs, see Findings of Fact, paragraph 122 which reads: "... Then, on July 20, 1995, just three days after IBM announced its intention to pre-install SmartSuite on its PCs, a Microsoft executive informed his counterpart at the IBM PC Company that Microsoft was terminating further negotiations with IBM for a license to Windows 95.  Microsoft also refused to release to the PC Company the Windows 95 “golden master” code.   The PC Company needed the code for its product planning and development, and IBM executives knew that Microsoft had released it to IBM’s OEM competitors on July 17. ..."
  2. The words "any software that competes" allow for retaliation against the development, distribution, promotion, use, sell, or licensing of any technology that competes against Microsoft technologies. Examples of such technologies, include but are not limited to: technical standards, open or proprietary protocols, services, hardware products, etc.

Section III.A1 should be not be constrained or qualified in these ways. The existing Section III.A.1 should be left as part of the text and a new paragraph should be added to the list. Thus Section III.A.4 (a new paragraph) should be:

 

Comment III.3

Section III.A.2 reads:

Microsoft currently forbids OEMs, or it imposes Market Development Agreement penalities or it withholds Consideration from OEMs when they offer for sell Personal Computers without a Microsoft Operating System. Because of the earlier consent decree imposed on Microsoft, instead of requiring that every Personal Computer include a Microsoft Operatin System, Microsoft requires that for each model of Personal Computer offered by the OEM that each Personal Computer of that model be sold with a Microsoft Operating System. If this isn't done, Market Development Agreement penalties or Considerations are withheld from the OEM. Theoretically, the OEM is free to offer a model of Personal Computers for which it expects to sell such a high fraction of them without a Microsoft Operatin System, that offering them in that way doesn't cause harm or competitive disadvantage to the OEM. In reality, node of the models of Personal Computers are expected to sell in any large enough percentage without a Microsoft Operating System, thus the OEM ends up paying for a Microsoft Operating System for each Personal Computer for each model that it offers, thus it is forced to always pay for a Microsoft Operating System.

Microsoft, additionally requires that the end user of the Personal Computer accept a license agreement, and the it indicates that if the license agreement is not accepted, that the Microsoft Operating System product should not be used and that the Personal Computer manufacturer should be contacted for a refund.
Because of Microsoft per unit per model royalty imposition on the OEM, the OEM has no incentive to provide such a refund to the end user and these requests are largely ignored by the OEMs thus resulting in end users that desire to purchase a Personal Computer to pay for a software licesnse for a Microsoft Operating System, even if they never use such a software.

Given Microsoft's creativity in constraining OEMs in their business decisions, a broad based term should also be included.  For example, Microsoft could technologically constraint the OEM from supporting non-Microsoft Operating Systems, for example by Microsoft imposing on the OEM technological standards that must be used in the Personal Computer design and because of intellectual property reasons the use of these standards prevent non-Microsoft Operating Systems from functioning on the Personal Computer (for example because Microsoft might have patents on the technology).

Section III.A.2 should be augmented with these subclauses to allow consumer to purchase Personal Computers without a Microsoft Operating System:

Comment III.4

Section III.A by virtue of enumerating the activities that the OEM "is or is contemplating" allows Microsoft to retaliate for any activities not explicitly enumerated in this list (III.A.1, III.A.2, III.A.3, etc). A broad term should be added that prevents Microsoft from any other cause for retaliation. Section III.A.5 should be added (Section III.A.4 was proposed to be added above in Comment III.2):

Comment III.5

Section III.A in the fith paragraph (the paragraph under III.A.3) reads in its last two sentences:

There are three problems with these sentences:

  1. The time period of thirty days for cure is extremely short and would lead to unnecessary hardship on the OEM because of product distribution considerations (channel, distribution, resellers) that might require a constly product recall to be able to cure in thirty days.  A period of at least 90 days is more appropriate. It is interesting to notice how terminating a Covered OEMs license and thus putting the OEM immediately out of the Personal Computer business is codified into this consent decree, when any restraint on Microsoft's illegal monopolistic behaviour requires (so far) years of litigation and continued complaints about how "draconian" such measures are.
  2. The non-obligation to provide a termination notice can be used by Microsoft as a means of retaliation by not enforcing contractual terms on some OEMs while enforcing them on others, thus easily allowing for just two such notices to cure to be used as retaliatory means. The number of notices should be a function of time, for example 2 notices per year .
  3. Microsoft should be required to enforce contractual terms in a non-discriminatory way across all OEMs, it should not be allowed to selectively enforce contractuals terms because it would provide an easy retaliatory tool against the OEMs.  Additionally, Microsoft must show that if it makes efforts to enforce certain terms, then it must enforce all terms across all OEM with equal effort, dilligence and strength.
  4. The notion of termination notices, per se, is problematic, because termination notices might not even correspond to actual OEM behaviour but to misunderstanding between the parties or Microsoft's desires for retaliation against the OEM.  Any such termination notice should be submitted to the Technical Committee for technical consideration, the Microsoft Internal Compliance Officer, and to all the Plaintiffs; together with detailed documentation of the non-discriminatotry enforcement by Microsoft of these and any other contractual terms across all Covered OEMs. This communication is important because it ensures that the antitrues enforcement parties are involved from the start when any such notice is given.

Comment III.6

Section III.A, last paragraph reads:

These issues should be addressed:

  1. Such Consideration should be offered to all Covered OEMs in a non-discriminatory basis.
  2. The Consideration should be objectively measured according to established accounting practices. 
  3. The Technical Committee, the Microsoft Internal Compliance Officer, and all Plaintiffs should be informed and provided a copy of any and all such agreements and be allowed to requests additional documentation and conduct interviews related to the agreement.

Comment III.7

Section III.B, first paragraph reads:

Issues:

  1. In the first sentence, where it reads "... with uniform terms and conditions." it should read: ".... with uniform terms and conditions and Considerations." Considerations established outside or after the license agreement has been entered should be communicated to the OEMs in a uniform manner. All agreements and Considerations should be provided to the Technical Committe, the Microsoft Internal Compliance Officer, and all Plaintiffs and these parties must be allowed to requests additional documentation and conduct interviews related to the agreements and Considerations.
  2. Microsoft in the past has discriminated against OEMs and other Personal Computer manufacturers (for example Apple) by threatening to not make Microsoft products available on those manufacturers computers, for example Microsoft Office cancellation for Apple's MacIntosh systems.  Additionally, Microsoft has used the OEM prices of these non-Operating System products as a means to discriminate against OEMs. The prices and the offering of any Microsoft product to any Covered OEM for bundling with a Personal Computer should be non-discriminatory and subject to uniform license agreements.
  3. Volume discounts of groups of Microsoft Operating System Products and Microsoft non-Operating System Products should not be allowed, because it might lead to exclusion from the market of products that competed against the Microsoft non-Operating System Products.  For example, group discounts for a bundle of Microsoft Windows XP and Microsoft Office; or Microsoft Windows XP and Microsoft Word (or Microsoft Excell, etc); or Microsoft Windows XP and Microsoft Works;  must not be allowed.

Comment III.8

Section III.C reads:

This should read:

For example, Microsoft could, through verbal or written communication, or through the quality of service that it provides the OEM restrict the OEM, or threaten the OEM from exercising the alternatives. Microsoft has in the past retaliated against OEMs, particularly IBM and Gateway, as is described in detail in the Findings of Fact through means other than agreements.  For example by witholding IBM participation in marketting programs, or threatening Gateway with sofware audits.

Comment III.9

Section III.C.1 and others enumerate:

this list should be:

Comment III.10

Section III.C.1 ends in "with respect to non-Microsoft and Microsoft products." This should be changed to read: ""with respect to non-Microsoft and Microsoft products or technologies that offer similar types of functionality." For example, the technology might be provided by a network service and not by a product installed in the Personal Computer, how the technology is provided should not be a reason for allowing Microsoft to retaliate or discriminate.

Comment III.11

In general, section III.C.1 and throughout the document, it is assumed that the only way to allow applications or software facilities to be used is through "icons, shortcuts, or menu entries", when in reality, applications/middleware can also be activated by associating it with particular types of data, and when such types of data are accessed, the application associated with it is activated.  For example, when a file with a given extension is accessed, or when a URL is accessed over the internet, the type of the data is determined and the application associated with that type of data is activated.  It is vital that such associations be allowed in a non-discriminatory basis between Microsoft and non-Microsoft technologies.  For example, when a Internet audio URL is accessed, the media player associated with the data type is invoked to cause the audio to be decoded and played. It is not unsusual for multiple competing technologies, such as Microsoft Media Player, Real Networks and Apple's Quicktime media players to be capable of supporting the same data types, thus the preservation of the setting chosen by the user is important. Discrimination in this area has occurred in the past against both Apple's Quicktime and Real Network's Real Player.

The document should be updated throughout to take into account this form of application activation through data type and file name extension associations.

Comment III.12

Section III.C.2 reads: The term shortcuts should be replaced with icons, because many types of items can be shown on the desktop and these are not limited to shortcuts. For example, applications, files, folders, etc.

Comment III.13

Section III.C.3 reads: Issues:
  1. The qualification: "if a Microsoft Middleware Product that provides similar functionality would otherwise be launched automatically at that time" is simply a form of restraint of trade. Microsoft usually doesn't lead in innovation, it follows, copies and bundles other's innovations into its products. It is unreasonable to require that Microsoft launch some software at a particular time to allow others to launch their software at that time. Usually some third party or OEM will developped these concepts and only later (much later sometimes) Microsoft will copy the concepts and include them in their versions of such functionality.  The qualification should be removed.
  2. The second qualification is also very unresonable, here Microsoft again thinks that it can dictate or retrain through its actions (or lack thereof) the innovations of others. The qualification reads: "provided that any such Non-Microsoft Middleware displays on the desktop no user interface or a user interface of similar size and shape to the user interface displayed by the corresponding Microsoft Middleware Product. "  Again, it is ludicrous that competing ISVs or OEMs be reatrained to only mimic Microsoft's actions when usually innovation happens the other way around.  This qualification should be removed.  Why should microsoft care about the size of the user interface? If the OEM creates a user interface that is too small, or narrow, or large, it doesn't cause any harm to Microsoft, only to the OEM in user dissatisfaction and support costs (none of which are Microsoft's concern given that it doesn't bare any of those costs, and given Microsoft's treatment of Hewlett Packard with respect to startup sequnce shells, it has shown that it doesn't care about those OEM costs).
  3. The qualification "if a Microsoft Middleware Product that provides similar functionality" also allows for Microsoft restraint of other's innovations, the definition of Microsoft Middleware Product is particularly weak and full of escape clauses. The qualification should not be present at all.
  4. The time qualification and enumeration of the circumstances and times under which launching can occur "at the conclusion of the initial boot sequence or subsequent boot sequences, or upon connections to or disconnections from the Internet" should also be removed.  There are many reasons why lounching might be desireable at other times.
  5. Launching of should not be restricted to "Non-Microsoft Middleware", any software should be allowed to be launched.
Section III.C.3 should read: It should be noted that the original Section III.C.3 precludes the implementation of IAP sign up sequences, OEM shells, end user tutorials that are desired to be lounched at the initial and subsequent boot sequences. For example the OEM might present an IAP sign up sequence until such a time when the user as made such a selection or when the user as indicated that it doesn't want to asked again in subsequent sign up sequences. The reason the Section III.C.3 precludes even the implementation in the initial boot sequence is because Microsoft can remove their own facilities from startup or from displaying a user interface, thus forcing the OEM to remove their facilities. Freedom of innovation and choice by the OEMs cannot be at the mercy of Microsoft's actions.  For example, Microsoft might move such facilities to the second boot sequence and it might require that the system reboot after an initial boot sequence process, the OEMs would then not have the freedom to provide their facilities in the second boot sequence.

Comment III.14

Section III.C.4 reads: This section should be augmented in this way: Given the nature of existing restraints by Microsoft in this area, these additional clauses allow for less restraint by Microsoft on the OEMs actions.

Comment III.15

Section III.D reads: Issues:
  1. The text "via the Microsoft Developer Network (“MSDN”) or similar mechanisms" allows Microsoft not to use the MSDN program which is broadly available and non-discriminatory, and allows instead for Microsoft to extract other agreements and conditions from the interested parties. The intent should by "via the Microsoft Developer Network (“MSDN”) or successor developer program (if the MSDN program is discontinued or replaced by a new developer program, but such a program should be equally broadly available and equally non-discriminatory as the MSDN program was on the earliest date the proposed consent decree was filled with the Court by Microsoft and the Plaintiffs)."
  2. The text "APIs and related Documentation" should be extended to include "APIs, related Documentation, Protocols, File Formats, Data Formats, Certification/Validation Component Signatures, and any other technological mechanism".
  3. The text "that are used by Microsoft Middleware to interoperate with a Windows Operating System Product ", given the loose definition and the escape clauses that Microsoft can invoke in that definition, and given that Microsoft also markets a wide variety of non-Middleware software and hardware, the text should be corrected to require full disclosure of the use by these software and hardware products of Microsoft Operating System facilities. The proposed text is shown below.
  4. The requirement that disclosure only occur in the case of a new major version of Microsoft Middleware allows Microsoft an easy exit from their documentation requirements. Microsoft has stated in fron of the District Court (Judge Jackson) that a sandwich would be part of the Operating System if they so dictated, clearly Microsoft cannot be trusted to name a release major or non-major, because to Microsoft it would be whatever they desire at such a time. Furthermore the mechanism of Major and first Minor point release numbers is highly ambiguous and maleable, certain Microsoft products don't even have a version number (Windows XP, Microsot .Net). In any case, whether a product release is major or minor should not be an excuse for non-diclosure, a small bug fix release wouldn't have many changes on interface use, so its documentation requirements would be proportional to the effort spent in the release development. If this restriction is not removed, facilities would remain undocumented, simply because Microsoft doesn't use them initially in their so called major release but instead only uses them initially in a minor release; or even more easily by making every release a minor release. Microsoft has shown in the earlier Consent Decree entered with the D.O.J. that it will take advantage in any ambiguity.
The new section should thus read:
D.    Starting at the earlier of the release of Service Pack 1 for Windows XP or 12 months after the submission of this Final Judgment to the Court, Microsoft shall disclose to ISVs, IHVs, IAPs, ICPs, and OEMs, for the sole purpose of interoperating with a Windows Operating System Product, via the Microsoft Developer Network (“MSDN”) or successor developer program (if the MSDN program is discontinued or replaced by a new developer program, but such a program should be equally broadly available and equally non-discriminatory as the MSDN program was on the earliest date the proposed consent decree was filled with the Court by Microsoft and the Plaintiffs), the APIs, related Documentation, Protocols, File Formats, Data Formats, Certification/Validation Component Signatures (and Microsoft shall not restraint or deny such signature facilities or enablements), and any other technological mechanism  that are used by Microsoft Middleware, Microsoft Application, Microsoft  Hardware Products, or by newly introduced Microsoft Operating System features (that are similar to existing facilities available from third parties in the market) to interoperate with a Windows Operating System Product.  In the case of a any new version of Microsoft Middleware or Microsoft Operating Systems, or Microsoft Application, the disclosures required by this Section III.D shall occur no later than the last major beta test release of that Microsoft Middleware.  In the case of a new version of a Windows Operating System Product, the obligations imposed by this Section III.D shall occur in a Timely Manner.

Comment III.16

Section III.E should be augmented where it reads "on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms" to read "on reasonable, non-discriminatory and non-royalty bearing terms." The imposition of per unit royalties as a condition to grant access to any Communication Protocol would allow Microsoft to exclude competitors from the market.

Comment III.17

Section III.E reads: There are many issues with this section:
  1. Communication Protocols can be used for communication between two or more personal computers running a Windows Operating System Product installed on client computers. For example a client computer can share a disk drive so that its file are accessed to other client computers, such functionality doesn't require a Microsoft server operating system product. The ability to interoperate natively should not be restricted to the Communication Protocols used to interoperate natively with a Microsoft server operating system product, for example a competing non-server client operating system might require to implement these protocols to be competitive. For example, both Apple's MacOS X client operating system and client versions of the GNU/Linux operating systems contain incomplete implementations of the file sharing protocols used by Windows Operating System ). Section III.E shall apply equally to both client and server operating systems to allow them interoperate natively with Windows Operating System Products installed on client computers.
  2. To circumvent the provisions in Section III.E Microsoft could do this in future (major or minor) releases of its Personal Computer Operating System Products: (a) do not include software that implements future revisions of a Communications Protocol with the Windows Operating System Product installed on a client computer; and (b) request from the Microsoft server operating system product the software that the client requies at first boot, each boot, or at under other circumstances. Thus Microsoft would have circumvented the requirements stated in Section III.E because there would be "addition of software code to the client operating system product" (which Section III.E.ii requires that it be "without the addition of software code to the client operating system product"). By  Microsoft implementing a new protocol (which it would not have trouble documenting to 3rd parties) that the client computer's Windows Operating System Product would use to request these addional software codes from a Microsoft server operating system product the circumvention would have been achieved.  Thus by removing the existing components that implement existing Communications Protocols all kinds of Communications Protocols would thus be allowed to remain undocument in future releases of a Windows Operating System Product by Microsoft, thus denying the purpose of allowing native interoperability between other operating systems and Windows Operating System Products. Microsoft, through privave key signin and public key signature validation, Microsoft would be able to sign these software components to ensure their origins (Microsoft) and that they have not ben tampered, thus allowing every Communications Protocols to remain undocumented, including security protocols, filesystem protocols, transaction management protocols, etc.The intent of Section III.E is good because it is pro-competitive, but the actual terms easily allow Microsoft to circumvent that intent. Software is very maleable, terms used to describe it, such as: "without the addition of software code" are easily circumvented, for example by slicing the software and requiring thatthere be "addition of software code", this can be done easily and transparently (i.e. without knowledge by end user).
  3. The word "implemented" is also used to describe the software, and can lead to arguments or circumvention from Microsof with respect to meaning.
  4. The description of what is being made available is ambiguous. Instead of "Microsoft shall make available ..., any Communications Protocol", it should be stated clearly what is being made available. A description of what should be made available is shown in the proposed revision to Section III.E below.
Section III.E should be replaced with:
E.   Starting nine months after the submission of this proposed Final Judgment to the Court, Microsoft shall make available for use by third parties, for the sole purpose of interoperating with a Windows Operating System Product, on reasonable (without an up front fee and royalty free) and non-discriminatory terms (consistent with Section III.I), technical  implementations for any Communications Protocol that is, on or after the date this Final Judgment is submitted to the Court, utilized by a Windows Operating System Product nstalled on a client computer to interoperate with (i) a Microsoft server operating system product, or (ii) a Windows Operating System Product. The means through which any such Communications Protocol shall be made available shall include:
In the abscence of such a precise and complete set of specifications as described in Section III.E.a (above), or at Microsoft's choosing or by direction of the Technicall Committee, Microsoft shall provide instead: Additionally:

Comment III.18

Section III.F.1.a reads: Microsoft has shown that it retaliates against OEMs when they support non-Microsoft software in general, not just Microsoft Platform Software, for example the retaliation against IBM because of IBM's intent to bundle SmartSuite with their Personal Computers as can be seen in the Findings of Fact.

Section III.F.1.a should be expanded to read:

Comment III.19

Section III.F.2 reads: Issues:
  1. Again, Microsoft retaliates against OEMs (IBM) to product Microsoft products other than its Operating Systems.
  2. Allowing Microsoft to enter into agreements that "place any limitations on ISV's development, use, distribution or promotion of any such software" is an open ended means under which Microsoft can cause ISV's to act in manners that Microsoft desires. For example, Microsoft might extend the MSDN agreements with limited sublicensing of Microsoft patent pools and extract in exchange agreements from all ISVs in the market to limit their development, use, distribution or promotion of any other software. The litigation to ensure that those limitations are not "reasonably necessary to and of reasonable scope" would probably take another 4 years of litigation. The Plaintiffs must remember that one of Microsoft's options at any time is to relly on the ambiguities of these terms and use them to realize their means, given that it has been shown that Microsoft has monopoly power int he x86 compatible Personal Computer market its retaliatory means must be reduced as much as possible.
Section III.F.2 should read: Microsoft has more than enough resources to all the software development that it requires, if it has to relly on outside parties to do software development, it must do so without placing limitations.

Comment III.20

Section III.G.1 reads: These are the issues:
  1. The text: "except that Microsoft may enter into agreements in which such an entity agrees to distribute, promote, use or support Microsoft Platform Software in a fixed percentage whenever Microsoft in good faith obtains a representation that it is commercially practicable for the entity to provide equal or greater distribution, promotion, use or support for software that competes with Microsoft Platform Software" allows Microsoft to extract agreements from these parties under which at least, by assuring itself of a 50% distribution, promotion or usage share it guarantees that no competitors technology can be bradly available on a large fraction of Personal Computers so that it can become a platform for cross-platform software. For example by ensuring that 50% of new Personal Computers don't include such software, Microsoft can ensure that such software doesn't obtain critical mass as a platform.
  2. These kinds of allowances, given Microsoft's behavior, only serve to codify Microsoft's right to extinguish competition. It codifies the right and means through which Microsoft can cut other parties "air supply".
  3. By restricting these terms to "Microsoft Platform Software" it allows Microsoft to enter other kinds of agreements in which the means to kill innovation and drive others off the market is by developping non-Platform Software, for example by developping Applications, giving them for free and forcing these parties to distribute them at 50% usage share.
The whole exception should be removed and Section III.G.1should read: Furthermore, the agreement that Microsoft might enter might require that the OEM doesn't distribute certain non-Microsoft Sofware without actually requiring the distribution of Microsoft technologies. Thus a new clause should be added, Section III.G.3:

Comment III.21

Section III.G.2 reads: Again the restriction is too narrow with respect to Microsoft's other means of distributing software, it should read:

Comment III.22

Section III.G contains this, it is the second to last paragraph in the section: Microsoft should be allowed to enter into these arrangements, but it should be allowed to require it to  "prohibits such entity from competing with the object of the joint venture or other arrangement for a reasonable period of time.".  Again, "reasonable period of time" is ambiguous and open ended, and non-compete clauses have no pro-competive role other than exclusionary when included in agreements by a Monopolist such as Microsoft.  Joint development or joint services agreements should not be restricted in this manner. If an actual separate entity is formed, a joint venture that includes the incorporation or foundation of a separate independent legal entity, the entity in question could have non-competition restrictions placed on it, but not the shareholder companies themselves (i.e. Microsoft and the other party).

Comment III.23

Section III.G, last paragraph, reads: This statement, is very ambiguous and unqualified. The meaning of "Microsoft licenses intellectual property in from a third party" could easily mean that Microsoft products that include any third party intellectual propery are exempt from the section. Most Microsoft products contain third party software, certainly its operating systems do (for example the Veritas/Seagate backup software and the Veritas Volume Manager included in both Windows XP and Windows 2000; the BSD software included in Windows 2000 and Windws XP; the Mosaic sofware included in all version of Internet Explorer; the Java software included in Windows 2000 and Windows XP; the printing drivers and other device drivers from IHVs included in Windows 2000 and Windows XP; the amount of software licensed into these products is very large; etc). Additionally, there can also be other forms of intellectual licenses that apply to these and other products (for example licenses to use patents of third parties). If the clause is intended to mean something different from my interpretation, please explain what it is intended to mean, and what terms in that sentence ensures that only that meaning is allowed.

This sentence should be removed completely from this section. Alternatively, a sentence that says:

Comment III.24

Section III.H.2 (the first such section, there are two such sections in Section III.H) reads: These are the issues:
  1. The text "require confirmation from the end user" should include statements that ensure that Microsoft will not act in a discriminatory or derrogatory manner in those confirmations. For example, Microsoft should not be allowed to include as part of that confirmation process: documentation, help, verbal communitation or any other means discriminatory or derrogatory statements. Examples of such statemetns are: "By choosing this option, Microsoft voids the warranty of the product or disclaims its obligation to provide support. Microsoft has not tested this third party option, use at your own risk. Use of this option might cause data loss, corruption, etc." Microsoft has included messages in their products purposedly to cause third parties to not use non-Microsoft technology. The Windows 3.0 betas included messages similar to these when Windows realized that it was running on top of Digital Research's DR-DOS Operating System (instead of running on top of Microsoft's MS-DOS).
  2. These statements: "launch the Microsoft Middleware Product in a separate Top-Level Window and display either (i) all of the user interface elements or (ii) the Trademark of the Microsoft Middleware Product." allow for Microsoft to easily subvert the intent by not Trademarking the Microsoft Middleware (while allowing compound Trademarks suchs as "Windows (R) Stuff"), by only showing all but one (1) of the user interface elements.  The restriction to a separate Top-Level Window means that by providing it in a subwindow of an existing window on in a visually separate top level window that is controlled by a Microsoft non-separate or independent process, these escape clauses, again provide Microsoft with a a myriad ways to escape the intent of the clause. Additionally because of the software maleability the restriction to only Microsoft Middleware Products should not apply.
Section III.H.2 (the first such section, there are two such sections in Section III.H) should read:

Comment III.25

Section III.H.3 allows for "(b) seek such confirmation from the end user for an automatic (as opposed to user-initiated) alteration of the OEM’s configuration until 14 days after the initial boot up of a new Personal Computer". Such confirmation must be sought through non-discriminatory and non-derrogatory means (as outlined in Comment III.23). Additionally such confirmation from the end user must allow the user to reject the continued request for this confirmation by providing an easily visible checkbox that indicates: "would you like to be asked this question again in the future?" if the user doesn't want this question to be asked in the future it selects the checkbox and the question is never asked again (and the current settings remain unchanged).

Comment III.26

Section III.H.3.2 (the second such section, there are two such sections in Section III.H) reads: Issues:
  1. The "designated Non-Microsoft Middleware Product" term should be "designated Non-Microsoft software or technology".
  2. Requirements to host a paricular ActiveX control must require that Microsoft proactively documents the interfaces of the particular ActiveX control, and doesn't prevent through signature or any other mechanism such hosting by the Non-Micorosft software or technology.
  3. The "provided that the technical reasons are described in a reasonably prompt manner to any ISV that requests them" text shold read "Microsoft must pro-actively and broadly (through the MSDN program and web sites) describe the technical reasons reasonable manner." Any such "valid technical reasons" must be communicated to the Technical Committee, the Microsoft Internal Compliance Officer and the Plaintiffs.
Section III.H.3.2 (the second such section, there are two such sections in Section III.H) should read:

Comment III.27

The last paragraph of Section III.H.3 reads: Issues:
  1. Again this is tied to Microsoft Middleware Prodcuts, it should be replaced by the broader term.
  2. When a technology "exists" can lead to ambiguity given that Microsoft might dictate that technology doesn't exist until it determines (at its sole discretion) that it exists. This ambiguity is not required.
The last paragraph of Section III.H.3 should be removed completely. Microsoft can introduce new Microsoft Middleware, Microsoft Applications, Microsoft Technologies, Microsoft Hardware at any arbitrary point in time after the release of an Operating System product. In so far as those Microsoft technologies alter user's preferences and default system settings, saving and restoring those settings sould be supported through an Operating System mechanism and user interface that allows for these settings to be manipulated.

Comment III.28

The first paragraphs of Section III.I reads: The text "shall offer to license" requires that licensing be offered, it doesn't require that it actually enter into such license agreements. The text should instead read:

Comment III.29

Section III.I.1 reads: Allowing for per unit royalties or prohibitive up front licensing fees might prevent Microsoft competitors from actually being able to participate competitibly in the relevant product markets. This Section III.I.1 should read instead: For example such a license would not require royalties from a server Operating System to interoperate with a Microsoft Operating System for Personal Computers, but if the server Operating System makes use of the licensed intellectual property to interoperate with non-Microsoft Operating Systems for Personal Computers, then a royalty might be required by Microsoft.

Comment III.30

Section III.I.2 reads: XXX

Comment III.31

Section III.I.3 reads:

Not allowing the transferring or assignment of these parties rights under certain circumstances, for example under an acquisition, is inherently a form of discrimination. Given that the licenses are to be offered in a non-discriminatory fashion, it is important that such licenses once offered be available in the future and that the licensing not be restricted to a given period of time. If subsequent versions of technology become available, and new licenses are developped for that technology, the older licenses to the earlier technology should continue to be offered for the earlier verisions of the technology.

Comment III.32

The paragraphs immediately after Section III.I.5 reads: XXX

Comment III.33

Section III.J.2.b reads: Microsoft shall not unreasonably dispute the licensee's assertions with respect to III.J.2.b, any individual member of the Technical Committee through direct communication with the prospective licensee can make a positive determination about the III.J.2.b requirement and inform Microsoft about its determination without any further Microsoft argument, dispute or delay about the prospective licensee meeting the III.J.2.b requirement (Court intervention shall not be required).

Section III.J.2.b should read:

Comment III.33

Section III.J.2.b reads: It should instead read:

Comment III.34

Section J.2.d  reads: The issues are:
  1. Should be at Microsoft's expense, not the licensee's.
  2. Verification should bot be performed by "third-party verification, approved by Microsoft" if such verification is required by Microsoft it should be done under staff hired by the Technical Committee and at Microsoft's expense and not through unknown for profit relationships and agreements between a third party and Microsoft. The intent of this section is for "proper operation and integrity of the systems and mechanisms", Microsoft should be satisfied with the Technical Committee staff performing these duties unless its goals are other than those expressed herein.
  3. The text "to test for and ensure verification and compliance with Microsoft specifications for use of the API or interface, which specifications shall be related to proper operation and integrity of the systems and mechanisms identified in this paragraph" refers to to a "Microsoft specifications for use of the API or interface", these specifications shall be made available to the licensee.
Section J.2.d should read:

Comment IV.1

Section IV.A.2.a reads: This should be expanded to include electronic forms of communication in electronic form, not printed form, because it is extremely hard to sift through information, such as source code, in non-electronic form.

Section IV.A.2.a should read:

Comment IV.2

Section IV.B.2 describes "The TC members shall be experts in software design and programming." section IV.B.2.c reads: Given that Microsoft competes in almost every software market conceivable, it is a strecth to request two years of non-compete agreement from the TC member. Two such years of non-compete could be provided only if Microsoft provides two such years of salary to the TC member with a yearly inflationary bonus adjustment per year.

Comment IV.3

Section IV.B.8.iii reads: This should reads:

Comment IV.4

Section IV.D.4.d reads: This is one of the most egregious terms of the settlement. Given that the Technical Committee has hardly any actual enforcement duties, other than monitoring, and the Technical Committee actually being an impartial participant in the actual history of Microsoft's interaction with third parties and Microsoft's possible violations of settlement terms, it is astonishing that this term mandates that the actual work product of the Technical Committee not be admissible as evidence of the settlement enforment activities.

Microsoft deifnitely over-reached by requesting this, this shows Microsoft's true intentions (another 5 years without actual enforcement plus maybe another 5 of further litigation), Microsoft should be forced to accept instead the contrary of this term.

It is an interesting legal question if any documents related to presummed antitrust violations are made the work product of the Technical Committee, then by IV.D.4.d and those documents being un-admissible, then what other documents could be used to initiate Court proceedings by the plaintiffs without any such documents being alleged by Microsoft as being derived from the TC's un-admissible work.  How could the plaintiffs promptly produce equivalent analysis without it being under this gag order?

Section IV.D.4.d must read:
If the Plaintiffs are not willing to mandate this rewritten IV.D.4.d they are engaging in blatant dereliction of duty of the antitrust enforcement offices and duties that they purport to serve.

Comment IV.5

Section IV.D.4.e reads: It should read instead:

Comment V.1

Section V.A reads: The Final Judgement should last longer than five years.  The actual initial antritrust violations by Microsoft occured more than five years ago and we are still without any form of remedy. The legal system works very slowly. By entering this Final Judgement, and Microsoft continuing its anti-competitive practices, it would probably take more than five years to resolve those further complaints. Given that the orignal D.O.J. vs Microsoft settlement that related to per computer unit licensing was ambiguous enough that it ended up being mostly ignored and full antritrust proceedings were required, it wouldn't surprise me if this agreement which is even more ambiguous and has many more loopholes means at Microsoft's disposal to circumvent its intent would not result in many more years of litigation without any real behaviour change on Microsoft's part.

Mandating an expiration only after Microsoft no longer has monopoly power in the market of Operating Systems for Personal Computers for Intel x86 or x86 compatible systems is more appropriate. Court proceedings or the under the parties agreement and Court supervision would be required for the settlement to expire. Otherwise a period longer than 5 years, at least 12 years should be mandated.

It must be observed how durable has Microsoft's monopoly been and that it was initially cemented through antitrust violations for which a Final Judgement with no teeth got the industry into its current state:
  1. Since the mid 80s it faced no competition. Through illegal competitive behaviour, it foreclose the market to then Digital Research's DR-DOS product (an atlernative to Microsoft's MS-DOS). Microsoft has recently settled a separate antitrus suit by the current owner of the DR-DOS assets (Caldera). These original violations animated the first consent decreed between D.O.J. and Microsoft 1995. That consent decree was determined to be ambiguous by the appellate Court in its allowance of integration, and a full antitrust lititgation ensued.
  2. Even though Microsoft's technology significantly lagged behind the technical abilities of the systems (for example it took Microsoft 10 years to produce a quasi 32 bit operating system after x86 Intel 32 bit capable operating systems became available in the market) no other competitors could enter the market because Microsoft moved from per-unit licenses to per-system licenses for each model of system that the OEM manufactured (and this continued to exclude other vendors from the market).
  3. The one significant threat that Microsoft has faced to its personal computer operating system monopoly has been the advent of the Internet with open standards and as a means for delivering applications from server computers (either through Java or directly as web applications)  or through middleware based applications that could perform on Microsoft Operating System based personal computers or personal computers running other operating systems. This one threat has been completely erradicated from the market. Microsoft will continue to exclude Java as a viable Internet based application delivery mechanisms, because this Final Judgement doesn't mandata the allowance of interoperability of Sun's Java with Microsoft's Internet Explorer (the Top Level Window definition is purposedly design to make this impossible).
Dereliction of duty now from the Plaintiffs would mean that even under the most blatant violations of antritrust laws and astonishing findings of fact, that Microsoft would escape with a Final Judgement that is too short and very weak from many perspectives.  12 years of enforcement seem the minimal time for market conditions to actually have another opportunity to arise and for actual market change to actually occur.

Comment V.2

Section V.B reads: The Plaintiffs in any enforcement proceeding shall not be limited to only one extension of two years. If the Plaintiffs cannot request as a remedy to future Microsoft's violations of this settlement, then it is not clear if the Court can actually mandate a remedy that is not being requested. Additionally, limiting the length of the actual extension at this time and as part of this settlement seems beyond belief given that any enforcement will require the Court participation because there is no actual real enforcement (other than monitoring by the Technical Committee with its work product later bein un-admissible as court evidence and without the TC members being allowed as witnesses).

Section V.B should read:

Comment VI.1

Definition VI.A reads: Issues are:
  1. API refers to the interfaces that are used not only by Microsoft Middleware uses, but any other software uses.  APIs are mostly used by regular applications, narrowing the definition of APIs to what Microsoft Middleware uses is a contorted way to allow even more freedoms of circumvention to Microsoft. For example for Microsoft to perform anti-competitive practices through undocumented interfaces that its applications use, but that Microsoft's Middleware doesn't use, thus excluding those APIs (by definition!) from being covered by this settlement.  Amazingly, this definition proposed to define API to mean something other than Application Programmin Interface, do you see the word application?  It is not Middleware Programming Interface!  Simply amazing!
Definition VI.A should be replaced by the definition in the Final Judgement entered by Judge Jackson (definition 7.b): If another definition is adopted, it should be explained why it is different from the one proposed.

Comment VI.2

Definition VI.B reads: Issues:
  1. Given that Communication Protocols relevant to this settlement (given the proposed changes in other sections) also exist between two personal computers, the definition should reflect that.
  2. The set of tasks between the parties in a protocol doesn't have to be predefined, there are protocols under which the parties actually sent pieces of arbitrary code to each other to perform actions that are arbitrary.
Definition VI.B should read:

Comment VI.3

Definition VI.J reads: This is a very astonishing definition of Middleware, nowhere does it talk about software that provides APIs to other software components, which is core to any definition of Middleware. The definition of Non-Microsoft Middleware (VI.M) does seem appropriate to what Middleware is. Definition 7.q in Judge Jackson's Final Judgement should be seen for a reasonable defintion of Middleware: These notions in the VI.J “Microsoft Middleware” definition are astonishing: Both of these (VI.J.2 and VI.J last paragrpah) should be removed from the definition.

The term VI.J.4 seems to be there only for the purpose of allowing Microsoft to slice and recombine its software in such a way as to ensure that the user interface component be the one called the "Microsoft Middleware" and not the components that acutally perfrom the traditional Middleware functionality (see Jacksons definition above) of providing APIs to other software.  It is very intereseting that Middleware is mostly not about user interfaces but about providing interfaces to other applications, applications that relly on the Middleware as a platform.  Most Midleware doesn't have a user interface, if it has one it is incidental.

The term VI.J.4 should be removed.

After these adjustments, Defintion VI.J should just be:

Comment VI.4

Definition VI.K reads: The first issue with this definition is, what is the connection between VI.K.2 and the presumably subordinate VI.K.2.a and VI.K.2.b ?  The sentence under VI.K.2 seems incomplete, it should end in something like : Other issues are:
  1. Throughout the trial Microsoft and depositions (but not before litigation was brought into action) would not budge on its pretense incomprehension of what an Internet Browser is. They would only talk about browsing technologies but would react stupified to the notion of Internet Browsers, particularly their own, when they were referred to as "the browser product." It is amusing and without any sign of legal thouroughness that the Plaintiffs have come to agree with Microsoft to a definition that uses the term "Internet browser" without actually providing a definition for such a term anywhere in the proposed Final Judgement. Not even what a Internet  Browser is being agreed amongst the parties in the dereliction of duty that this document embodies.
  2. Given that this section includes other disputed terms such as Internet Explorer, it sould seem to be important to include precise definitions about what these actual terms mean. Maybe when the Plaintiffs try to do this together with Microsoft they will realize that only contorted definitions such as the ones for API, Microsoft Middleware, Microsoft Middleware Product, etc. are arrived at.
  3. Again software can be or stop from being a Microsoft Middleware Product depending on whether it is trademarked or not (which to no ones surprise is another contorted and unnatural definition by itself).
  4. VI.K.2.b.i refers to "distributed separately by Microsoft from a Windows Operating System Product", that term should be precisely defined to mean what it seems to mean, because Microsoft having argued in court that a sandwich is part of Windows if they soley dictate so, then they surely would say that any code "is distributed as part of a Windows Operating System" even if the code is sent to the end user in a CD-ROM inside a sandwich not included in the Windows box, or more complexily and seriously, if it is sent to the user's system through a the Windows update process.
  5. VI.K.2 seems to require that the functionality be "part of any Windows Operating System Product" but immediately and sub-ordinated to that clause it also says VI.K.2.b.i "distributed separately by Microsoft from a Windows Operating System Product" which seems to contradict the pre-requisite governing condition (it has to be both part of and not part of?), that would be by necessity the empty set, because something cannot be both part of something and not part of something; thus redering the whole contorted VI.K definition sense-less.
  6. The final paragraph on VI.K states that:

Definition VI.K should be replaced by:

  Additionally, reasonable definitions of what these mean should be included as separate definitions: "Internet Explorer, Microsoft’s Java Virtual Machine, Windows Media Player, Windows Messenger, Outlook Express and their successors in a Windows Operating System Product"

Comment VI.5

The word product should be replaced by technology in definition VI.M because not all middleware is made available in a product form, some of it might be made freely available or under conditions or packaging that don't relate directly to it being a product: It shold read:

Comment VI.6

The requirement under VI.N.ii that: Seems excessive, a more reasonable number of one hundred thousand copies is more appropriate because the benefits of the settlement can benefit nascent technologies and not just more established ones.

Comment VI.7

The definition under VI.O of OEM is self centered, to be an OEM, the OEM has to be a licensee of a Windows Operating System Product.  How do new OEMs come to be if Microsoft refused to license its products directly or uses intermediaries not under its ownership control but under agreement control to do actual sublicensing?  The definition of an OEM should be independent of whether they at any given point in time they have a direct license from Microsoft (instead of purchasing the product in the channel like smaller OEMs do).  The definition of Covered OEM already takes care of them being licensees.
'O.    “OEM” means an original equipment manufacturer of Personal Computers that is a licensee of a Windows Operating System Product.'
Should be:

Comment VI.8

Definition VI.Q reads: The only concern here is if: are constructed from Intel x86 or x86 compatible processors and Microsoft offers a version Windows for them that allows any software designed for Personal Computers to work on those systems, then what those products would be are: For example today Microsoft offers a fully functional Personal Computer as its game console, the Microsoft Xbox. If Microsoft were to offer Windows XP for that system, it would not only be a game console but also a fully function Personal Computer.  Under those circumstances it should not be excluded from the definition.

Comment VI.9

Defintion VI.R reads: Without actual evidence about the actual size of the MSDN subscription base, it seems safer to rewrite this. Addtionally because of naming issues, the term "beta test version" should be expandded into its meaning:

Comment VI.10

Defintion VI.S reads: This definition is purposedly constructed to prevent:
  1. An alternative Jave Virtual Machine (for example from Sun Microsystems) from being invoked when Java Applets are invoked through a web page because the window controls are the window controls of the Internet Browser and the Java Applet executes within the same window. By Microsoft using this defitintion to condition where it allows non-Microsoft Middleware to be invoked it controls the most important way for Java application execution (i.e. under a more complex web based application). Thus Microsoft having killed Netscape Navigator's viability proceeds to deny Java the remaining vehicle that it could have enjoyed under this settlement, i.e. under Internet Explorer. Of course the Plaintiffs do nothing other than acquesce under this settlement either because of dereliction of duty or blatant technical misunderstanding of the issues involved. 
  2. For example, the "live chart" stock quotes provided (through Java applets) by www.quote.com or the Chess application provided (Java applet) by www.chessclub at
The notion of Top Level Window must be extricated from the settlement and Microsoft should allow invocation of ActiveX based components of the non-Microsoft Middleware under all circumstances, in a manner similar under which today third party software is invoked under a non Top Level Window and displayed within the Internet Explorer window without a problem (for example see how Adobe's Acrobat Reader is displayed under a non-Top Level Window). Microsoft has done already all the technical work in this area, an it is now only putting contractual road blocks to all these natural forms of invocation of non-Microsoft Middleware.

Comment VI.10

 Definition VI.T reads: The main issue throughout this proposed settlement with respect ot Trademarks is that software is what it is irrespective of what it is called.  The definitions of Microsoft Middleware and Microsoft Middleware Product where conditioned with them being trademarked (under this definition) as a means to provide Microsoft and escape clause to make the no longer Microsoft Middleware (and Microsoft Middleware Products). That concept should completely go away. If it doesn't then the defintion of Trademarked shold be exactly the legal defintion understood under the law and not this one.

Comment VI.11

Defitions VI.U reads: The list must also include Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows SE, Windows ME (collectively known as Windows 9x) and Windows NT 4.0 and all their service releases.  The current installed base is mostly made out of these products.  By purposedly excluding them Microsoft and the Plaintiffs allow Microsoft to continue to prevent non-Microsoft Middleware from fairly competing in the broad installed base and forces competition to only occur under Microsoft's controlled evolution of the market.  It does so by not allowing competition from the broad installed base by not affording the benefits of the settlement to that gigantic installed base (i.e. all the versions of Windows 9x).
 
Updated January 23, 2024