| Slide 1 Merger Enforcement:A Quest for Efficiency
 New York State Bar AssociationAntitrust Section Annual Meeting
 Thomas O. BarnettAssistant Attorney General
 Antitrust Division
 U.S. Department of Justice
 January 25, 2007  Slide 2
   Slide 3
 Overview  Merger Review Process Efficiency HSR process Burdens/Trends Merger Review Process Initiative (2001 Initiative & 2006 amendments) 				
Merger Enforcement Efficiency Transparency Mergers 2006 Highlights 				
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 Merger Review Process Efficiency  HSR premerger review process Since 1976, investigate most potentially anticompetitive transactions before merger is consummated More effective relief and greater certainty to merging parties 				
Enforcement Goals: Identify potentially anticompetitive transactions quickly so that remainder can close Reach the right enforcement decision quickly and with minimal burdens necessary 				
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 Process Efficiency  Transactions Cleared Without Additional Agency Review (FY 2002-2006)   		   [D]  5,927 of 7,210 transactions proceeded without the Agencies requesting information beyond the initial HSR filing 			
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 Process Efficiency  Transactions Cleared Without Agency Second Requests (FY 2002-2006)   		   [D]  Agencies issued 2ndrequests in 214 (3%) of 7,210 transactions 			
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 Process Efficiency  Antitrust Division Investigations Resulting in 2nd Requests (FY 2002-2006)   		   [D]  2ndrequests issued in 99 out of of 398 Division investigations 			
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 Process Efficiency  Volume of information produced Ten  years ago:  Few hundred boxes a “large” production Now:  Terabytes, millions of pages common Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T:  25 million pages 				
Concern for agencies as well as parties 			
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 Process Efficiency  Explanatory Trends: Technological change – electronic documents/data Complex products, specialized services, rapid change Merger analysis is increasingly sophisticated and data-intensive E.g., merger simulations and critical loss analysis 					
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 The Shape of Things to Come    Slide 11
 Process Efficiency  Conclusions: The volume of information will continue to increase Identify transactions that do not threaten harm to competition before issuing second requests wherever possible Improve ability to identify and process relevant information 				
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 Merger Review Process Initiative  2001 Merger Review Process Initiative Aggressive & efficient use of initial waiting period Tailor 2ndrequest investigations Focus investigations on dispositive issues (e.g.exchange mergers) Encourage open communication/dialogue Scheduling agreements 				
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 Merger Review Process Initiative  Antitrust Division Investigations Resulting in Second Requests (FY 2000-2006)   		   [D]  More effective use of the initial waiting period has enabled the Division to conclude more investigations without issuing 2ndrequests. 			
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 Merger Review Process Initiative   		   [D]  Slide 15
 Merger Review Process Initiative  2006 Amendments Announced in December ‘06 Internal review of merger investigations 				
“Process & Timing Agreement” merger review option Limit number of custodians/provide post-complaint discovery Contested litigation rare 				
Revised Model 2ndRequest 			
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 Better Information Collection    Slide 17
 Merger Enforcement Efficiency  Transparency  Slide 18
 Merger Enforcement Transparency  Parties:  Encourage open dialogue during investigation Public:  Enforcement actions Public:  Decisions to close Closing statements (e.g., AT&T/Bellsouth and Whirlpool/Maytag) 2006 DOJ/FTC Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines NY State Bar Association Annual Meeting Dinner 				
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 Mergers 2006 – Highlights  1860 transactions notified to the agencies (8.9% increase over FY 2005) Over 580 transactions filed so far in FY 2007 				
Antitrust Division: Opened 77 HSR + 20 non-HSR merger investigations Issued 17 2ndrequests 16 Transactions Modified 10 merger challenges filed 6 transactions restructured in response to Division investigations 					
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 Mittal/Arcelor  $33 billion steel merger, hostile transaction Anticompetitive effects in the $2.3 U.S. tin mill products market Consent decree requires sale of Dofasco (Arcelor subsidiary) or alternative tin mill product assets (Sparrows Point, MD or Weirton, WVa) if Dofasco sale not possible 			
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 Mittal/Arcelor  “Pocket” decrees  Used by Division for some time, but rare Insurance policy on a fix-it-first remedy Insurance policy on regulatory fixes (e.g., FCC/radio station mergers) May be used in rare cases where antitrust review interferes with market by operation of law (e.g., foreign tender offer regulations) 				
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 Maytag/Whirlpool  Residential washers and dryers High market shares creates initial presumption Initial Presumption Rebutted Well-established rival brands (GE/Frigidaire/Kenmore) Recent entrants with growing share (LG/Samsung) Large retailers (2/3rds of sales) can shift shares Excess capacity (U.S./Mexico/Korea) Customers/Internal Documents 				
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 Mergers 2006 – Year in Review   		   [D]  Slide 25
 Exelon/PSEG  $16 billion electricity generation merger Focus on mid-Atlantic region (NJ and PA) Complex merger analysis: Electricity generating plants not the same (hydro/nuclear/coal/gas turbine) “Fuel curve” Auction process 				
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 Exemplar Cost Curve   		   [D]  Note: For illustrative purposes only – not an actual representation of market conditions.  Slide 27
 Exemplar Cost Curve   		   [D]  Note: For illustrative purposes only – not an actual representation of market conditions.  Slide 28
 Exemplar Cost Curve   		   [D]  Note: For illustrative purposes only – not an actual representation of market conditions.  Slide 29
 Exelon/PSEG  Likelihood of substantial anticompetitive effects in the $19.8b mid-Atlantic wholesale electricity market Consent decree: Divest 6 electricity plants (5,600 megawatts of generating capacity) in PA and NJ Transaction ultimately abandoned 			
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 Telecommunications Mergers  Verizon/MCI SBC/AT&T AT&T/BellSouth Sprint/Nextel Cingular/AT&T Wireless 			
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 Wireless Telecommunications  |  | DynaTAX 8000X | RAZR 
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 | Introduced | 1983 | 2004 
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 | Weight | 2 pounds | 3 ounces 
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 | Cost | $4,000 | $200-400 
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 | Talk time | 30 minutes | 7 hours | 
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 Wireless Telecommunications  |  | 1985 | 2006 
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 | subscribers | 203,000 | 219 million 
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 | revenues | $354 million | $118 billion 
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 | Avg. monthly bill | $95 (1988) | $49.30 
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 | Avg. minutes of use | 140 (1993) | 740 (2005) 
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 | Effective price | 44 cents/minute (1993) | 7 cents/minute (2005) 
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 | Penetration | 1% in 1985 | over 71% (2005) 
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 | Cell sites | 599 | over 197,000 
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 | Direct employees | 1,697 | 238,236 | 
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 (from CTIA & FCC reports)  Slide 33
 Tunney Act Proceeding  Metro Area in Verizon Territory: CLEC Fiber   		   [D]  Slide 34
 Tunney Act Proceeding  Other Competitive Fiber   		   [D]  Slide 35
 DFA/Southern Belle  Dairy processing: anticompetitive effects in school milk contracts in 100 school districts in Kentucky & Tennessee Case history Pre-trial settlement 			
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 Benefits of Greater Transparency  Predicting Enforcement Actions More efficient planning by business More efficient review and resolution Fewer contested challenges Faster resolution through consent decrees 				
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 Greater Process Efficiency and Enforcement Transparency  WIN-WIN-WIN  Division-Business-Consumer Welfare  Slide 38
 Merger Review:A Quest for Efficiency
 New York State Bar AssociationAntitrust Section Annual Meeting
 Thomas O. BarnettAssistant Attorney General
 Antitrust Division
 U.S. Department of Justice
 January 25, 2007  |  | UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION
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