Volume 30

(1)  A violation of a voluntary departure agreement renders an alien ineligible for certain immigration benefits for a 10-year period.

(2)  Filing a motion to reopen to submit new evidence pertaining to a prior application for cancellation of removal does not relieve an alien of the consequences of failing to voluntarily depart.

No amount of bond is sufficient to ensure the respondent’s appearance at future immigration hearings in light of his multiple violations of motor vehicle laws, failure to establish a fixed address, and apparent lack of eligibility for relief from removal.

The Board generally will not exercise its discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte for an arriving alien to pursue adjustment of status before United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009), followed.

Where a declaration and amended asylum application filed shortly before the merits hearing do not merely add details but completely change the nature and substance of the respondent’s original claim, and the respondent does not adequately explain the prior omission, the Immigration Judge clearly errs in finding the respondent credible.

The Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent established the requisite likelihood of future torture was speculative and unsupported by the record where the Immigration Judge relied heavily on general country conditions evidence that was not particular to the respondent and did not show that the respondent could not internally relocate to avoid future torture.

The Immigration Judge erred in granting cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents as a matter of discretion where the Immigration Judge’s decision did not adequately account for the nature, recency, and seriousness of the respondent’s criminal record—including two drug-related convictions and an arrest for domestic violence in the past 5 years—and where the respondent’s equities were outweighed by his criminal record.

(1) The Immigration Judge erred in assessing the respondent’s flight risk where he did not address evidentiary issues regarding the viability of the respondent’s marriage, the lack of evidence of a sufficiently probable path to lawful status in the United States, evidence undermining the respondent’s claim of a fixed address given his use of a variety of different addresses, and issues regarding the credibility and reliability of the evidence claiming the respondent’s friend would financially sponsor him.

(2) A pending asylum application on its own is insufficient to mitigate flight risk.

The Immigration Judge erred in granting cancellation of removal for certain lawful permanent residents as a matter of discretion where the respondent’s positive factors were outweighed by his lengthy and serious criminal history and his failure to offer any objective evidence of rehabilitation.

A conviction for assault and battery in the second degree under section 16-3-600(D)(1) of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, which requires a reckless mental state and the actual or attempted infliction of “moderate bodily injury,” is categorically for a crime involving moral turpitude.

(1) The Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding the respondent credible when she gave inconsistent, nonresponsive, evasive, and implausible testimony about the approximately 200 pounds of methamphetamines secreted throughout her vehicle and $8,000 in cash she possessed. 

(2) The Department of Homeland Security demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that there is reason to believe the respondent was a knowing participant in illicit drug trafficking.

When mail sent to the only address in the record provided for a respondent is returned as undeliverable, there are no additional reasonably available or practicable steps the Board or an Immigration Court can take to effect notice.

(1) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that Immigration Judges and the Board must accept as true the facts set forth in an affidavit supporting a motion to reopen unless the facts are inherently unbelievable is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of the United States’ reasoning and holding in INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988), and the discussion of credibility in Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021). 

(2) In reviewing affidavits, declarations, or written statements of fact in support of a motion to reopen, Immigration Judges and the Board are not required to accept as true facts set forth by the respondent, even when those statements are not inherently unbelievable.

(1)  There is no presumption in favor of a continuance for aliens who have filed a prima facie approvable U visa petition with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.  Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 807 (BIA 2012), overruled.

(2)  In deciding whether an alien has established good cause for a continuance based on the pendency of a visa petition or future visa availability, Immigration Judges should apply the balancing test set forth in Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018), while keeping in mind the importance of the secondary factors and that good cause does not exist if visa availability is remote.

(3)  Aliens are not entitled to delay completion of their removal proceedings pending availability of a visa.  Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348 (BIA 1982), reaffirmed.

(1)  Immigration Judges should generally deny asylum applications filed by nationals of highly developed, democratic countries that broadly respect and protect human rights, except in extraordinary circumstances involving national security or foreign policy considerations.

(2)  European Union citizens are presumptively ineligible for a discretionary grant of asylum in the United States because they are entitled to indefinitely reside lawfully in any EU member state.

(1) An alien who, under a grant of advance parole, returns to a country of claimed persecution has abandoned his or her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, absent compelling reasons for the return.

(2) The application of a mandatory bar to relief is not triggered by the argument of counsel but is governed by the evidentiary record.

(1) The respondent failed to establish that he does not pose a danger to the community where he worked as a long-haul truck driver without a valid commercial driver’s license and was arrested for failing to stop at a port of entry on an interstate.

(2) An ambiguous social connection and uncertain financial ability to provide support do not fulfill the rigorous standards for a valid, reliable, and credible sponsor that may mitigate an alien’s flight risk. 

(1) The Board does not retain jurisdiction after remanding the record to the Immigration Court. Matter of Patel, 16 I&N Dec. 600, 601 (BIA 1978), clarified. 

(2) The Immigration Judge’s issuance of a new decision on remand without holding another hearing did not violate the Board’s remand order nor deprive the respondent of due process. 

The respondent did not meet his burden to show he is not a danger to the community where he has a conviction and arrests for driving and boating under the influence and a very recent arrest for domestic assault. 

An attorney suspended for submitting a brief containing artificial intelligence hallucinations and making false statements to the court regarding his use of artificial intelligence is properly subject to reciprocal discipline and is therefore suspended from practicing before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security. 

The Immigration Judge properly determined that the respondent did not merit cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 ‍U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2018), as a matter of discretion, where the respondent’s significant equities were outweighed by her involvement in money laundering and alien smuggling, conviction for child abuse, history of abuse and neglect investigations, and attempt to minimize her involvement in and knowledge of events that led to her grandson’s death. 

An Immigration Judge may pretermit an application for asylum and withholding of removal without the filing of a motion by the Department of Homeland Security.

The respondent did not meet his burden to establish that he is not a flight risk where he engaged in asylum fraud and where the Immigration Judge denied his application for asylum.

Reopening is unwarranted because the respondent’s claim of a lack of due process is speculative, based on a series of false assumptions and fallacious reasoning, and wholly unsupported by the actual evidence in the record.

The Immigration Judge erred in finding exceptional circumstances warranting sua sponte reopening and rescission of an in absentia removal order where the record did not support the respondent’s claim that an individual misled him into believing he did not need to appear in Immigration Court.

(1) The respondent’s admission to possessing and using cocaine makes him inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2024), and hence ineligible for adjustment of status.

(2) Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), does not require that the alien be informed of the precise statutory definition with the essential elements of the offense in question prior to making an admission. Matter of K-, 7 I&N Dec. 594 (BIA 1957), and Matter of J-, 2 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 1945), overruled.

In the absence of a timely answer to the Notice of Intent to Discipline, the Board generally does not diverge from the sanction recommended in a Notice of Intent to Discipline that is based on reciprocal discipline.

An alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony is inadmissible under section 212(a)(8)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8)(A) (2024), as an alien who is ineligible to citizenship. Matter of Kanga, 22 I&N Dec. 1206 (BIA 2000), overruled.

(1) When inter-proceeding similarities are considered in a credibility determination, the redaction of personally identifying information from inter-proceeding declarations provides sufficient protection of the declarants’ privacy and comports with the confidentiality regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)–(c) (2026). 

(2) The procedural safeguards set forth in Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015), do not require declarants to be made available for cross-examination before the Immigration Judge can consider the declarations for inter-proceeding comparison. Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015), clarified.

The Immigration Judge erred in determining that the respondent met his burden of proving he is not a danger to the community where the respondent engaged in street racing and was arrested for driving on a suspended license, resisting arrest, and possession of contraband while in police detention.

(1)  The respondent did not demonstrate that summary dismissal of the Department of Homeland Security’s appeal was appropriate where he showed no prejudice from electronic service.

(2)  The Immigration Judge properly declined to consider documents filed after the merits hearing when the record was left open solely for the filing of other, specified documents and the respondent did not show prejudice from the exclusion of the late documents.

(3)  The respondent did not show he was prejudiced by the Immigration Judge qualifying the expert witness in certain areas but not others.

(4)  Where the respondent was not credible and did not provide sufficient corroborating evidence regarding his sexual orientation, he did not establish eligibility for protection under the Convention Against Torture on that basis. 

(1) The removal of former President Maduro from power and the ensuing transfer of executive authority constitute a change in country conditions in Venezuela for purposes of assessing an applicant’s prospective fear of persecution.

(2) Remand is required because the Immigration Judge did not sufficiently assess the effect of the changed country conditions on the respondent’s particularized risk of future persecution.

(1) When mailing a notice to appear by regular mail, the Department of Homeland Security can rely on the most recent address the alien has provided. 

(2) For purposes of an in absentia removal proceeding, written notice of the proceedings is sufficient if mailed to the most recent address the alien provided, which includes an address the alien provided before the issuance of the notice to appear. Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2001) (en banc), overruled.