U.S. Department
of Justice
Housing and Civil Enforcement Cases
United States v. Clarendon Hill Somerville, LP (D. Mass.)
On May 10, 2013, the court entered a consent decree resolving United States v. Clarendon Hill Somerville, LP (D.Mass.), a Fair Housing Act HUD election referral. The complaint, which was filed on December 19, 2012, alleged Clarendon Hill Towers violated the Fair Housing Act by refusing to rent to a couple because they had three minor children. The consent decree requires standard injnctive relief, non-discriminatory occupany standards, record-keeping, reporting and training. The consent decree also required the defendants to pay $13,000 to the HUD complainants. Defendants also include; Linda Hamilton, Jill Oullette, and Donna McCarthy. The case was referred to the Division after the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) received a complaint, conducted an investigation, and issued a charge of discrimination.
United States v. Philadelphian Owners Association (E.D. Pa.)
On October 9, 2012, the court entered a consent order in United States v. Philadelphian Owner's Association (E.D. Pa.), a HUD pattern or practice/election case. The complaint, which was filed on September 28, 2012, by the United States Attorney's Office alleged that the Philadelphian Owners' Association (POA), a condominium association that manages a 776 unit condominium complex in Philadelphia violated the Fair Housing Act by denying a resident with a disability a reasonable accommodation for an emotional support animal and by having and implementing a no-pets policy limiting the use of assistance animals in the complex. The consent decree requires the POA to pay the complainant $15,000 in monetary damages, establish a $15,000 settlement fund for additional potential aggrieved persons, and pay a $10,000 civil penalty to the United States. The decree also requires the POA to adopt a reasonable accommodation policy, have its members undergo education and training and imposes reporting and record-keeping requirements. The case was referred to the Division after the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) received a complaint, conducted an investigation, and issued a charge of discrimination.
United States v. Bank of America N.A. d/b/a Bank of America Home Loans (W.D.N.C.)
On September 13, 2012, the United States filed a complaint and consent order in United States v. Bank of America, N.A. d/b/a Bank of America Home Loans (W.D.N.C.) The complaint based on a HUD election referral, alleges that Bank of America discriminated on the basis of disability and receipt of public assistance in underwriting and originating loans, by requiring loan applicants who receive Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) income to provide a letter from their doctor as part of the loan application. The consent order requires the Bank to maintain revised policies, conduct employee training and pay compensation to victims. Bank of America will pay $1,000, $2,500 or $5,000 to eligible mortgage loan applicants who were asked to provide a letter from their doctor to document the income they received from SSDI. Applicants who were asked to provide more detailed medical information to document their income may be paid more than those who were asked to have a doctor verify their source of income. In addition, the HUD complainants who initiated this suit received a total of $125,000. The consent order was entered on October 10, 2012 and later amended on December 06, 2012.
United States v. Rutherford County, Tennessee (M.D. Tenn.)
On July 18, 2012, the United States filed a complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order in United States v. Rutherford County, Tennessee (M.D. Tenn.), alleging that the county violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) when, in compliance with a state chancery court ruling, it refused to process or issue a certificate of occupancy to the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro for a recently constructed mosque. The same day, the court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the county to immediately conduct an inspection of the mosque, to inform the Islamic Center of any deficiencies and to issue a certificate of occupancy once all deficiencies have been corrected by the Islamic Center, notwithstanding the chancery court orders. The complaint states that a certificate of occupancy is needed immediately so that the Islamic Center can hold worship services at the new facility during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins at sundown on July 19. The complaint alleges that the county's refusal came as a result of a recent state chancery court order last month, which, acting in response to a motion brought by individuals opposed to the mosque, enjoined the county from processing or issuing a certificate. The chancery court ruled that the county had provided insufficient public notice prior to the hearing at which the county approved the mosque's site-plan. The chancery court imposed a heightened notice requirement on the mosque, one not imposed on other religious or secular organizations. The case began when the Islamic Center, which has been operating in Rutherford County since 1982, sought to construct a new mosque for its growing congregation. In 2009, it purchased land for that purpose and applied for site-plan approval. After considering the proposal at a regularly scheduled, advertised meeting, the county approved the site plan. Following the county's approval, opponents of the mosque filed a lawsuit in state court seeking to stop construction. Ultimately, with the exception of the plaintiffs' public-notice claim, the chancery court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The United States' filed an amicus brief in Estes v. Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission (Chancery Court for Rutherford County, Tennessee) on October 18, 2010. On July 29, 2014 the court dismissed the case.
United States v. Town of Colorado City (D. Ariz.)
On April 18, 2017, the court in United States v. Town of Colorado City (D. Ariz.) issued an order adopting the jury’s findings that the Town of Colorado City and the City of Hildale engaged in a decades-long pattern or practice of police misconduct and housing discrimination. The court ordered expansive relief, including requiring the defendants to revise the policies of the Marshal’s Office, adopt new internal affairs and hiring practices, hire two new officers, hire both a police-practices consultant and a mentor for the Chief of Police, conduct training on civil rights laws, revise numerous municipal policies and procedures, and subdivide the land in Colorado City. The court will appoint a monitor to track compliance and report to the Department of Justice and the court. On April 19, 2016, the court entered a settlement agreement which resolved the monetary aspects of the United States’ claim under the Fair Housing Act and provides for $1,435,000 in damages to nine aggrieved persons and $165,000 in civil penalties. On March 7, 2016, a federal jury in Phoenix returned a verdict finding that the towns of Colorado City, Arizona, and Hildale, Utah, and their joint water company systematically discriminated on the basis of religion against individuals who are not members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (FLDS) in the provision of housing, utility and policing services in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The jury also issued an advisory verdict on the Department of Justice’s claims under Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. Because this statute (in contrast to the Fair Housing Act) does not include a right to a jury trial, the jury’s verdict as to the Section 14141 claim is advisory and may be considered by the court, but is not binding. In its advisory verdict, the jury found that the Colorado City Marshal’s Office, the cities’ joint police department, operated as an arm of the FLDS church in violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment; engaged in discriminatory policing in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the establishment clause; and subjected individuals to unlawful stops, seizures and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The complaint, which was filed on June 21, 2012, alleged a pattern or practice of police misconduct and violations of federal civil rights laws, including allegations control have allowed the FLDS Church to improperly influence the provision of policing services, utility that the cities, their joint police department, and local utility providers under the cities' services and access to housing and public facilities, and that this improper influence has led to discriminatory treatment against non-FLDS residents. The adjoining towns of Colorado City and Hildale are located on the border of Arizona and Utah and are populated primarily by members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (FLDS Church). The FLDS Church is not affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The complaint alleged discrimination based on religion in violation of the Fair Housing Act, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, and Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This is the first lawsuit by the Justice Department to include claims under both the Fair Housing Act and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.
Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs (5th Circuit)
On March 14, 2012, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiffs in Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs (5th Circuit). This case involves a small church that leased space in the central business district of Holly Springs, Mississippi, but was denied a permit to renovate and occupy the space. In Holly Springs, churches must meet a number of standards that other uses need not meet, including approval of the Mayor and Board of Alderman and the approval of 60% of homeowners within a 1,300-foot radius. After the church's permit was denied, it filed a complaint under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), challenging the ordinance both facially and as applied, and sought a preliminary injunction against the city. The court denied the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff had not showed irreparable harm. The United States' amicus brief argues that the disparate treatment of churches compared to other assemblies violates Section 2(b)(2) of RLUIPA, which provides that religious assemblies may not be treated on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and institutions. The brief also argues that the church had shown that it would be irreparably harmed if the discrimination against it were allowed to continue.